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Abstract 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, actors in the capital market are all expected to behave 
rationally. In practice, both investors and managers can be prone to irrational behavior. This research 
focuses on the irrational behavior by investors. For example, their investment decisions are 
influenced by company names and name changes. Companies with a more fluent, easier to 
pronounce name experience increased trading of their stock and at a premium.  In hot investment 
markets, irrational investor respond to cosmetic name changes, which suggest a connection to a hot 
style. This results in an increased stock price. The dot.com bubble of the late 90’s was such a hot 
market. Investor decisions are also affected by ranking of stocks. Under pressure of time and due to 
limitations on resources and to restricted cognitive capacity, information searches are cut short. The 
searcher stops early at the first option that meets predetermined criteria. The visibility of 
information increases its prominence in this process, so being on top of a list offers advantages. In 
the western world, alphabetical listings are common. Because of the search shortcuts, earlier 
alphabetical entries on the list gain preference. In stock markets, this leads to an alphabetic bias in 
which companies higher up the alphabetical listing see an increased fi rm value due to an elevated 
frequency and volume of the trading in their shares. This effect has been found to be less 
pronounced for larger firms. 
Rational managers can make use of market irrationality by changing their company name and moving 
it up the alphabetical ranking, such as Google’s managers have  done when they chose to continue to 
trade under the name Alphabet. Current literature on the alphabetic bias among investors suggests 
that improving the company’s alphabetical ranking is a relatively low-cost method of boosting the 
firm’s value.  
In this research, both the investor’s and manager’s behavior in relation to alphabetical name 
changes, name changes that move the company’s name up or down the alphabet,  have been 
explored: Is investor behavior influenced by alphabetical name changes and do managers improve 
their company’s alphabetical ranking when changing names? Investor behavior is investigated by 
determining the effect of the name change on the company stock’s price development. Based on the 
existing literature, a positive cumulative abnormal return is expected for companies improving their 
alphabetical ranking, especially when they move to the top of the list. The effect is anticipated to be 
moderated by firm size, with larger firms being less affected. The managers’ response is derived from 
the shift in the alphabetical distribution of the company name initials. As an improved ranking offers 
advantages, a shift towards to the top of the alphabet is expected. A firm size effect is hypothesized, 
with smaller firms being expected to more readily improve their visibility by moving up the 
alphabetical ranking.  
A database of 91 name changes over the period 1999 – 2015 of companies listed at the NYSE and 
NASDAQ has been collected. Investor response to the individual name changes has been derived 
from event studies in which the actual stock return for a firm is compared to the expected stock 
market return for said firm based on its co-movement with a market index, in this case the S&P 5001. 
The resulting cumulative abnormal return is the excess return for a stock that is unexplained by the 
general stock market development. These event studies have been performed for two event dates, 
                                                                 
1
 The S&P 500 (Standard and Poor’s 500) is an American stock market index, which traces the share price 
development of 500 large companies l isted on the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
3 of 54 | P a g e  
 
the announcement date and the date of first trading on the stock market under the new name.  The 
cumulative abnormal return data for the 91 cases has been correlated to the shift in the alphabetical 
ranking resulting from the name change. The moderation effects of firm size, industry class and 
company market value over book value have been investigated.  To research the behavior of 
managers in relation to the alphabetic bias, the name changes themselves have been analyzed for 
shifts in their alphabetical ranking, taking into account the potential moderation effect of firm size. 
The analysis of the investor behavior shows that the cumulative abnormal return around the first day 
of trading under the new name is positively correlated to the improvement of the alphabetical 
ranking. This effect is most significant for firms moving to the top of the list by choosing a name 
starting with an “A” or a “B”.  This confirms that investors are irrationally affected by the alphabetic 
bias, not only for existing names as has been shown in the existing scientific literature, but also 
where name changes are concerned. The positive effect is more prevalent for smaller firms, which 
supports the firm size moderation hypothesis that large firms are less affected by the alphabetic bias. 
Comparing the alphabetical distribution of the old and new firm names for the  91 name changes 
shows a shift towards the start of the alphabet. Of the firms in the dataset, over 20% chose a new 
name starting with an “A”. This supports the hypothesis that managers look to improve their 
company’s ranking when choosing a new name. This behavior is moderated by firm size. Managers of 
smaller companies use this method of increasing prominence more readily than those of larger firms.  
This research supports the suggestion from the literature that improving the alphabetical ranking of a 
company is a low-cost method to increase the firm’s value, especially for smaller firms.  Rational 
investors could benefit from the irrational behavior of other investors by taking a position or selling 
just before trading under a new name starts. Managers of small firms looking to choose a new name 
for their firm, would be wise to take the alphabetical implications in consideration and with all else  
being equal opt for a name that starts with an “A”. Since more firms may adopt this strategy, starting 
with “Aa” may be worth considering, as long as this does not clash with another name bias, the effect 
of the name fluency.  
 
Keywords: Irrational investor behavior, Alphabetic bias, Catering, Name change, Event 
Study, Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
 
4 of 54 | P a g e  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The author would like to thank Jeroen Derwall for his support and constructive criticism throughout 
this research project. His initial provision of name change dataset for the period 2014 - 2015 offered 
a running start. 
Furthermore, the author would like to thank Clifton Green and Russel Jame for kindly sharing their 
name change dataset, which they used for their paper on the effect of name fluency on investor 
behavior (Green, 2013). 
In addition, the author wants to express his gratitude to his study partner, Steven Baggen, with 
whom he embarked on the Master in Management Sciences project. Working together has been an 
educational and motivational experience, helping tremendously in finishing the degree within the 
two years set out for it. 
Finally, the author would like to recognize the support and assistance of his wife, Marjolein van Keep, 
throughout the last two years. Her acting as a critical proof reader has been of great help. 
 
  
5 of 54 | P a g e  
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................2 
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................4 
1. Introduction...............................................................................................................................7 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical background ............................................................................8 
2.1 Irrational Markets and Name Changes ...................................................................................8 
2.2 Alphabetic bias .....................................................................................................................8 
2.3 Impact of alphabetic bias on investor behavior.......................................................................9 
2.4 Rational Managers.............................................................................................................. 10 
2.5 Conceptual Model .............................................................................................................. 11 
2.6 Rational versus irrational market response........................................................................... 12 
3. Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 13 
3.1 Data Collection ................................................................................................................... 13 
3.2 Operationalization .............................................................................................................. 14 
3.3 Data-analysis ...................................................................................................................... 17 
Test Hypothesis 1 ................................................................................................................. 17 
Test Hypothesis 2 ................................................................................................................. 18 
Test Hypothesis 3 ................................................................................................................. 18 
Test Hypothesis 4 ................................................................................................................. 18 
Test Hypothesis 5 ................................................................................................................. 19 
3.4 Methodological Issues ........................................................................................................ 20 
4. Findings ................................................................................................................................... 21 
4.0  Descriptive statistics...................................................................................................... 21 
4.1 When rebranding the company name managers tend to choose a new name that is earlier 
in the alphabet......................................................................................................................... 23 
4.2 Smaller firms are more inclined to seek a higher alphabetical ranking. ............................. 26 
4.3 Changing to an earlier alphabet name leads to a higher abnormal return response in the 
market than changing to a later alphabet name. ........................................................................ 28 
4.4  Corporate name changes to names starting with an A, B or C lead to higher abnormal 
returns that changes to a name starting with a letter further down the alphabet......................... 30 
4.5 Large firms will not experience an abnormal return response to an earlier alphabetic name 
change. ................................................................................................................................... 31 
5. Conclusions, discussion and recommendations ...................................................................... 33 
5.1 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 33 
6 of 54 | P a g e  
 
5.2 Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 33 
5.3. Recommendations for practitioners.................................................................................... 35 
5.4. Recommendations for further research .............................................................................. 36 
Literature references ................................................................................................................... 37 
Appendices.................................................................................................................................. 38 
Appendix I – Comparison 1999 – 2015 dataset with dataset Wu/Green....................................... 39 
Appendix II – SPSS Outputs ....................................................................................................... 41 
Hypothesis 2 $4.2 ................................................................................................................. 41 
Hypothesis 3 $4.3 ................................................................................................................. 44 
Hypothesis 4 $4.4 ................................................................................................................. 47 
Hypothesis 5 $4.5 ................................................................................................................. 50 
Appendix III – Industry Classification ......................................................................................... 53 
 
 
  
7 of 54 | P a g e  
 
1. Introduction  
 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the market response to alphabetic name changes and the 
catering behavior of managers towards name-related irrationality in the market, specifically 
regarding the alphabet bias. The scope of the study is the US stock market for the period 1999 - 
2015. 
 
Investors can respond irrationally to names, like name fluency (Green, 2013) or foreign sounding 
names of fund managers (Kumar, 2015) as well as to name changes, even when they are just 
cosmetic, as can be found in studies on responses to name changes involving dot.com additions 
(Cooper, 2001), dot.com rejections (Cooper, 2005b), mutual funds associating names with hot styles 
(Cooper, 2005a) and association with the oil or petroleum (Lin, 2016).  
 
In this research, the potential irrational investor response to alphabetic name changes as a result of 
the alphabetic bias is explored. The alphabetic bias is the bias towards earlier entries in an alphabetic 
list. When faced with an overabundance of choices, decision-makers make use of heuristics or 
shortcuts to come to an evaluation. The ease with which certain information is found, positively 
influences its salience in this process (Tversky, 1973). As individuals search sequentially and as easily 
accessible information gains salience, a primacy effect arises, in which earlier experiences are 
privileged (Carney, 2012). The alphabet bias is subcategory of the primacy bias. Itzkowitz (2016) and 
Jacobs (2016) researched the effect of the alphabetic bias on investor behavior and claim an 
increased liquidity, stock turnover and thereby firm value for firms with early alphabet names. 
Nguyen et al (2013) describe how rational managers balance three goals when facing an irrational 
market:  1. Catering, 2. Market timing and 3. Increasing intrinsic value. Catering refers to 
management decisions at inflating stock prices beyond the intrinsic value. Considering the pressure 
on managers to increase firm value and as both Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016) state, changing 
the name is a cheap way to do so, there is an incentive for rational managers to take advantage of 
the alphabetic bias. The additional aim of this study is to evaluate the catering behavior of managers 
towards name-related irrationality in the market, specifically regarding the alphabet bias.  
 
To analyze how investors respond to alphabetic name changes and whether rational managers use 
investors’ alphabetic bias to their advantage, a set of sub questions has been formulated:  
1. Do company names and name changes influence investor behavior? 
2. What is the alphabetic bias and what explanation does the literature give for this bias?  
3. How do company name changes impacting the alphabetical ranking of a company, influence 
investor behavior?  
4. Do managers improve their company’s alphabetical ranking when changing its name?  
 
This research builds on the findings of Jacobs (2016) and Itzkowitz (2016), who have found that an 
alphabetic bias amongst retail investors leads to increased liquidity and trading volume, thereby 
augmenting the company value. It adds to the body of knowledge on irrational market responses to 
cosmetic name changes, in this case an alphabetic name change. In addition, this research explores 
whether rational managers cater to this irrational behavior of investors, in line with Nguyen (2013). 
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2. Literature Review and Theoretical background  
 
2.1 Irrational Markets and Name Changes 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (Jensen, 1978) assumes investors rationally evaluating the available 
investment options. However, investors show biased behavior, for example relating to names.  Head 
(2009) shows that memorable ticker names that resemble actual words lead to higher daily returns. 
Kumar et al. (2015) find an effect of the name of fund managers on the mutual fund flow.  In the field 
of marketing, Bao (2008) finds that the ease of a product’s name pronunciation increases its brand 
recognition. Green and Jame (2013)  research this effect of name fluency in stock markets. They 
conclude that name fluency is an important source of familiarity and affinity that influences 
investment decisions. Consequently, companies with more fluent names experience higher levels of 
both retail and mutual fund shareholders as well as greater turnover and smaller transaction price 
impacts. This larger investor base and improved liquidity leads the stocks to trade at significant 
premiums. Managers respond to this irrational behavior in the event of corporate name changes by 
selecting more fluent names to reap the benefits in the form of a higher market valuation.  
Green and Jame’s (2013) paper forms part of a body of literature that explores and confirms the 
irrational response to name changes. Cooper et al. (2001) provide evidence that companies adding a 
dot.com association to their name during the internet boom experienced positive abnormal returns 
around the event date. After the internet bubble burst, Cooper et al. (2005b) reviewed the effect of 
companies removing the dot.com association in an effort “to avoid being lumped in with the rotting 
corpses of failed dotcoms”, confirming an irrationally positive market response, when a company did 
not just drop the dot.com reference, but changed the name altogether, even when the name change 
was not backed up by a fundamental change in business strategy. These abnormal returns were 
linked to a “hot” market, as there have been in the past the railway boom, the airline boom or 
recently the oil industry (Lin, 2016). Cooper et al. (2005a) extended this to mutual funds that 
changed their naming to associate themselves with “hot styles” and  were rewarded by investors for 
doing so .  
 
2.2 Alphabetic bias 
Investors are offered a large number of investment options. The rational approach to evaluating 
options would be to perform a full information search of all available alternatives. Due to constraints 
in processing capacity driven by limitations in cognitive capacity or time and resources, full 
information searches seldom take place (Bettman, 1998; Payne, 1976; Simon, 1956). Instead, a 
search will be performed until a “satisficing” alternative has been found (Caplin, 2011; Simon, 1956, 
1957). Satisficing is a decision-making strategy or cognitive heuristic posited by Simon (1956). 
“Alternatives are considered sequentially, in the order in which they occur in the choice set. The 
value of each attribute for the option currently under consideration is considered to see whether it 
meets a predetermined cut-off level for that attribute. If any attribute fails to meet the cut-off level, 
processing is terminated for that option, the option is rejected, and the next option is considered” 
(Bettman, 1998). The ease with which certain information is found, positively influences its salience 
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in this process (Tversky, 1973). As individuals search sequentially and as easily accessible information 
gains salience, a primacy effect arises, in which earlier experiences are privileged (Carney, 2012). 
Brogaard et al (2014)  show this primacy effect in a study on citing of articles, in which they find that 
lead articles in scientific journals are cited about 50% more often than articles later in the issues, with 
the second and third articles still showing increased relative citing numbers.  
The alphabet bias is subcategory of the primacy bias. In an alphabetic list, the choice set order is 
alphabetical. The satisficing heuristic implies that a decision-maker tends to start at the top of the 
alphabetical list, works his way down and stops when sufficient acceptable options have been found. 
The alphabet bias has been shown in a study on donations by alumni, where early alphabet alumni 
were approached more often and hence made more donations (Meer, 2011). Richardson (2008) 
showed the alphabetic bias among assigning editors of journals when searching for reviewers, where 
early alphabet potential reviewers are invited more often. 
With the advent of computers and internet, a decision maker is no longer forced to accept the listin g 
as offered in printed media and the individual can customize the ranking of the provided data to 
meet personal requirements. In practice, however, there is a bias to keep the status quo. Kahneman 
(1991) claims that the preference to keep things the way they are is driven by the endowment effect, 
in which one attaches additional value to one’s own possessions. This endowment effect in turn 
comes from loss aversion, in which the loss of said possession would weigh more than the acquisition 
of the same possession. As such, in leaving the status quo, the disadvantages loom larger than the 
potential advantages. Roxburgh (2003) follows a similar train of thought, though he sees the loss 
aversion and endowment effect more as separate, cumulative contributors to the status quo bias. 
Itzkowitz (2016) makes the case that without the status quo bias, the alphabetic bias would lose its 
significance. Jacobs (2016) fails to consider this critical component of the alphabetic bias.  
 
2.3 Impact of alphabetic bias on investor behavior 
The alphabet bias thus finds its roots in the primacy effect in combination with the status quo bias. 
Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016) find that firms with an early alphabet name (a firm name starting 
with a letter that is closer to the start of the alphabet) see a statistically significant higher level of 
liquidity (based on Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio) and trading volume among retail investors. 
Itzkowitz links the increases of liquidity and trading volume to an increase in firm value, in line with 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) who found that firms with higher levels of liquidity have lower 
required rates of returns among retail investors and higher firm values. This is supported by findings 
by Anderson (2012) that show that increased visibility influences retail investors’ behavior, leading to 
higher trading volume and turnover, and to lower spreads.  Itzkowitz, Jacobs and Anderson all find 
that, unlike retail investors, institutional investors are minimally affected by visibility and the 
alphabetic bias.  
Barber and Odean (2008) researched attention-grabbing stocks and found that salience increases 
liquidity and generates short-term abnormal returns, driven again mainly by inexperienced investors. 
Changing a company name is generally accompanied with a publicity campaign, which increases the 
visibility of a firm name. This visibility is enhanced by changing to an early alphabet name. In the 
alphabetic listing of the company names, the new name will appear higher up. Fedenia (2009) and 
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Ang (2010) find that investors unconsciously attribute more quality to a stock higher up a list. 
Itzkowitz et al. (2016) briefly looked at the alphabetic bias around name changes, but they found a 
dataset too small for statistical purposes. Jacobs and Hillert (2016) analyzed alphabetic name 
changes for the effect on trading volume and liquidity and found the same alphabetic bias effects, 
though the results were not statistically significant. Combining the salience effect of Barber and 
Odean (2008) with the alphabetic bias researched by Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016) leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
(H1) Changing to an earlier alphabet name leads to a higher abnormal return response in the 
market than changing to a later alphabet name. 
Jacobs and Hillert (2016) claim that the alphabetic bias is most significant in the top 5% of an 
alphabetic list, while still being significant in the 5 – 25% range. For company names in the 50 -100 % 
percentile, the effect is negligible. The top 5% falls completely in the letter A bracket. Extending this 
to the top 25%, extends the range to the starting letter C. Itzkowitz (2016) investigated this primacy 
effect in a similar fashion evaluating the dependence of the stock turnover on the ticker name initial 
letter, exploring the impact of the ticker starting with A, with A and B, with A, B and C. In all three 
cases, a positive effect was found, substantiated by a similar analysis of the first 200 and 300 stocks 
of the stock listing, and the top 10 and 20% by company name. This indicates that the alphabetic bias 
is more pronounced if the new name starts with an A, B or C. For alphabetic name changes, this leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
(H2):  Corporate name changes to names starting with an A, B or C lead to higher abnormal returns 
than changes to a name starting with a letter further down the alphabet. 
Jacobs and Hillert (2016) reviewed the relation between firm visibility, as proxied for by firm size, and 
the alphabetic bias, and found a negative correlation. Trading in more visible or larger companies is 
less affected by the alphabetic bias, than in smaller companies.    Itzkowitz et al. (2016) did not find a 
relation between firm size and the alphabetic bias.  Based on the Jacobs and Hillert (2016) findings, 
the follow hypothesis has been derived for the effect of the firm size: 
(H3): Large firms will not experience an abnormal return response to an earlier alphabetic name 
change. 
 
2.4 Rational Managers 
Faced with irrational market behavior, rational managers can use this irrationality in their favor. 
Nguyen and Schüβler (2013) have reviewed the literature for rational managers who are confronted 
with irrational markets. They discern three modes of response of rational managers: 1. Catering, 2. 
Market timing and 3. Increasing intrinsic value. Nguyen et al. (2013) state that “Catering refers to 
decisions that aim at boosting stock prices above the level of intrinsic value”.   
Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016) postulate that moving a company’s name up the alphabetical list 
is a relatively cheap way for a manager for boost a firm’s value. As their findings are fairly recent, 
managers may not have consciously incorporated the full effects of the alphabetic bias in their 
decision-making process. However, being accustomed to school and university rankings, but also 
bond rankings and industrial benchmarking, where A evokes a more positive feeling than B due to 
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the affect heuristic (Ang, 2010),  managers will acknowledge the importance of being at or near the 
top of a ranking and expect that this will bring benefits.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
(H4): When rebranding the company name managers tend to choose a new name that is earlier in 
the alphabet. 
Following the findings by Jacobs and Hillert (2016) that highly visible or larger companies will benefit 
less from an alphabetic name change than lower visibility or smaller firms, a similar moderation 
effect is expected for name changes, leading to the following hypothesis: 
(H5): Smaller firms are more inclined to seek a higher alphabetical ranking. 
 
2.5 Conceptual Model 
The purpose of this study is to extend the research into the catering behavior of rational managers 
towards company name-related irrationality in the market and whether the market responds 
irrationally to such alphabetic name changes.   
The literature review leads to five hypotheses, which are summarized by the following conceptual 
model: 
Figure 1: Conceptual model 
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2.6 Rational versus irrational market response 
Not every researcher attributes the market response following a name change to irrationality. Wu 
(2010) claims that the name changes are often driven by reputational considerations and that they 
foreshadow a significant upheaval in a business structure.  Wu argues that for radical name changes 
the response should therefore be rational. In contrast, any market response to renaming to a brand, 
to narrowing or to broadening of the business focus, can be deemed irrational. Wu claims that these 
results cast doubt on the findings of Cooper (2001, 2005a, 2005b). 
Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016) have found that due to irrational behavior of retail investors, the 
alphabetic bias leads to increased trading volume and liquidity, which in turn results in an increased 
company value. As the name change adds value to the firm, a positive market response to the 
announcement of an alphabetically more favorable name change would be rational, if the market is 
aware of the company value enhancing effects of the alphabetic bias. Since the findings by Itzkowitz 
(2016) and Jacobs (2016) are recent, no market knowledge of these effects can be expected for the 
period investigated, though a temporary increase in visibility due to press releases and news items 
could increase salience and thereby lead to a short-term abnormal response (Barber, 2008). No or a 
minimal correlation between an alphabetical name change and the cumulative abnormal return is 
therefore expected around the date of the announcement of the change in name. 
The full ranking impact occurs when the company starts to trade under its new name. Its name 
change will change its position on the list.  An abnormal market response that results from this 
change can be attributed investor’s irrational behavior, as according to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (Jensen, 1978) any impact of the company’s future free cash flows would have been 
factored into the share price upon the company disclosing its intention to change its name.  In the 
data analysis, the hypotheses have been tested for both the announcement date and the date of the 
first trading under the new name.  
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3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Data Collection 
 
Name change data for US based companies has been collected from various sources for the period 
1999 – 2015. Itzkowitz (2016) have found no impact of the alphabetic bias on the trading volume of 
stocks prior to 1999 and selected the period 1999-2012 as the sample for their research. Jacobs and 
Hillert (2016)  consider the period January 1983 up to December 2011. In their study, the start data 
1983 is chosen as this is when the trading volume data for NASDAQ has become available in CRSP. 
Jacobs did not review the impact of the year on the alphabetic bias. As Itzkowitz (2016) supports 
their claim that the alphabetic bias only occurs after 1999, their sample period has been followed 
and extended to 2015.  
 
The bulk of the name change data came from datasets as used by Wu (2010) and Green and Jame 
(2013), which has been kindly provided by Clifton Green and Russel Jame. The data for 2014 and 
2015 has been kindly provided by Jeroen Derwall. For the period 2009-2013, a google search for 
name changes as published on the www.prnewswire.com, has been performed. This led to a total 
dataset of 1,268 name changes in that period, although this is by no means a true representation of 
all name changes in the period 1999 – 2015.  
 
Green and Jame (2013)  classify name changes into four categories: 1. Corporate Restructure, like 
mergers and acquisitions, 2. Broad Focus, in which the name is changed to indicate the widening of 
the company’s focus, 3. Narrow Focus, signifying a narrowing in the company’s focus and 4. 
Rebranding. The latter includes using a successful brand name as the company name, modifying the 
current name to a more favorable name, like increasing the name fluency as Green and Jame 
researched, and completely changing the company name while keeping the company structure. To 
specifically review the impact of the alphabetic bias for companies changing their name, only 
Rebranding name changes have been considered, both the radical name changes and companies 
adopting one of their brands as their new company name. These are more likely to be free of 
changes in the underlying business model, which would confound the market response. The name 
changes have been further reviewed for the availability of financial data in open sources . The open 
sources used are Yahoo! Finance, the 10-Q and 10-K filings on www.sec.gov and in cases where such 
filing had not been submitted, the financial statements on the company websites. The availability of 
data proved to be a challenge as quite a few of the reviewed companies do no longer exist. It should 
be considered that this introduces a survival bias in the data. 
Finally, the outliers on Log(Firm Size) and on abnormal return (CAR_6T, CAR_11A) have been 
removed, by removing outliers outside the 6σ range. The resulting dataset consists of 91 name 
changes that are either radical or adoption of a brand in nature, and for which sufficient financial 
data has been available. 
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For each name change, the following data has been collected from www.sec.gov, 
www.prnewswire.com, Google, Yahoo! Finance and company websites: 
 BETA_Y!F = Company beta as given on Yahoo!Finance (Comparison purposes only)  
 EVD_T = Event date First date of trading under the new name (and ticker name if applicable)  
 EVD_A= Event date Announcement Name Change (First mention of name change on 
creditable websites. In some cases, no clear announcement date could be found, typically for 
the 1999-2000 data. In such cases, Wu’s (2010) begin dates were used)  
 EVENT_YEARA = Event year of Announcement 
 FIRM_IND_FULL = Firm Industry using Fama and French 49 Industry categories 
(Yahoo!Finance, own assessment based on public information)  
 NATURE_CHANGE = Nature of name change given. Only Rebranding (radical (R) or brand 
adoption(A)) name changes have been considered. (Google.com, Yahoo!Finance, 
www.prnewswire.com) 
 NEW_NAME = New company name 
 OLD_NAME = Old company name  
 #SHARES@EV = Number of Shares at Event Date (www.sec.gov: 10-Q/10-K or company 
websites, in million)  
 SPi,t @EV = Closing share price at event date (Not adjusted) 
 STOCK_MARKET  = Exchange stock is listed at (at event date) 
 TICKER = Stock ticker, ISIN   
 Total Stockholders’ Equity at Event Date (for P/B ratio calculation, from www.sec.gov: 10-
Q/10-K or company websites, in million)  
 Adjusted close data (for event studies) 
 S&P500 data (as base line for event studies) 
 
 
3.2 Operationalization 
 
To analyze the data, several variables need to be coded or calculated. OLD_NAME and NEW_NAME 
need to be coded into numerical values relating to the alphabetic position. If a name starts with an 
“A”, it has been coded as 26, “B“ as 25 and do on. The values have been captured under the variable 
names OLD_INIT for initial letter of the old name and NEW_INIT for the new name.  
 
For each name change, the change for each firm i has been calculated in number of places up or 
down alphabet (#STEPS), using the following equation: 
 
  #STEPSi = NEW_INITi - OLD_INITi                                                (1) 
 
For each of the firms reviewed, the following calculations have been performed: 
 NEW_LETTER = Initial letter of new name 
 NEW_LETTER# = NEW_LETTER converted to a numerical value (A=26,.., Z=1) 
 OLD_LETTER = Initial letter of old name 
 OLD_LETTER# = OLD_LETTER converted to a numerical value (A=26,.., Z=1) 
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 #STEPS = NEW_LETTER# - OLD_LETTER# 
 #STEPS_AB = #STEPS x NEW_LETTER# (=100 for A, 50 for B) 
 #STEPS_REL = IF( #STEPS>0, #STEPS/(26 - OLD_LETTER#),IF (#STEPS<0, #STEPS/ OLD_LETTER# 
-1), 0 : Indication of how much the name change used the alphabetical room to move, so 
going from M to J ranks lower than from M to B. 
 
To test the hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, related to the investors’ response to an alphabetic name change, 
an event study approach has been undertaken. MacKinlay (1997) describes event studies in 
economics and finance, and reviews the sample size effect on the power of an event study. This 
review claims a strong dependence of the needed sample size for a specified abnormal return level 
on the variance of the abnormal return. To test for an abnormal return of 1.5% under a variance of 4 
percent, a sample size of at least 100 needs to be selected randomly to achieve a power of the event 
methodology of more than 0.95 (MacKinlay: Table 2). With a sample size of 91, this condition is 
nearly met.     
 
For each event, the cumulative abnormal return has been calculated over the period of five days 
before the event up to five days after the event (more days leads to increased variance), to cover 
potential early leakage of the new name to the market. To reduce the variance, a second event 
period of t-1 up to t+2 has been reviewed, as well as the period t=0, t+5. The return response to the 
name change around the event date has been derived from Yahoo! Finance stock price information 
and compared to the S&P500 Index return to determine the whether the return response is 
abnormal. The expected return is calculated by using equation (2) 
 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖  𝑅𝑚 ,𝑡                                                                               (2) 
 
Where: 
Ri,t = Expected Return of Stock i on day t 
αi = Intercept of regression  
βi = Systematic risk of stock i: the βi has been determined over the “clean” period t – 90  
                             days up to t -31 days as per Cooper (2001)  
Rm,t = Market Index return on day t, for the S&P500 Index 
 
The abnormal return for stock i on day t is derived as follows: 
 
    ARi,t = ACTi,t – Ri,t     (3) 
 
Where: 
ARi,t = Abnormal Return of Stock i on day t 
ACTi,t = Actual Return of Stock i on day t 
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The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is calculated by: 
 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝐴𝑅
𝑡=𝑡0,𝑖+5
𝑡=𝑡0,𝑖−5
 𝑖 ,𝑡                                    (4) 
 
Where: 
CARi = Cumulative Abnormal Return of Stock i over the defined period  
t0,i = Event date: announcement of name change of firm i  
Ri,t = Return of Stock i on day t (Adjusted close from Yahoo!Finance) 
 
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns calculated, give the following variables: 
 BETAC_A = Beta calculated around the Announcement date 
 BETAC_T = Beta calculated around the first Trading date 
 CAR11_A = Cumulative Abnormal Return t-5,t+5 around Announcement Date 
 CAR4_A = Cumulative Abnormal Return t-1,t+2 around Announcement Date 
 CAR6_A = Cumulative Abnormal Return t=0,t+5 around Announcement Date 
 CAR11_T = Cumulative Abnormal Return t-5,t+5 around Date of first Trading 
 CAR4_T = Cumulative Abnormal Return t-1,t+2 around Date of first Trading 
 CAR6_T = Cumulative Abnormal Return t=0,t+5 around Date of first Trading  
 
Additional variables have been calculated as follows: 
 FIRM_IND_# = Numerical classification of the Industry category 
 FIRM_SIZE = #SHARES@EV x SPi,t @EV (m$) 
 LOG(FIRM_SIZE) = LOG(FIRM_SIZE) 
 PB_RATIO = Price/Book ratio @ Event Date Announcement = SP i,t @EV / (Total Stockholders’ 
Equity at Event Date / #SHARES@EV) 
 
Some of the P/B ratios came up negative as the book value was negative. The negative values have 
been changed to a positive P/B Ratio, by either comparing them to industry peers (Hand&Harm and 
Vector Group) or matching the P/B ratio for penny stocks (ITUS Group), which gave a rough 1:1 
correlation between P/B ratio and stock price at the event date.  
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From the collected and derived variable, the following dummy variables have been developed:  
 ADOPTION = 1 for NATURE_CHANGE = A, else 0 
 RADICAL = 1 for NATURE_CHANGE = R, else 0 
 FS_MEDIAN_SMALL = 1 for FIRM_SIZE Median, else 0 
 IND_DUMMY_X = 1 for FIRM_IND = X, else 0 
 NASDAQ = 1 for STOCK_MARKET = NASDAQ, else 0 
 NYSE = 1 for STOCK_MARKET = NYSE, else 0 
 NEW_INIT_AC = 1, if NEW_LETTER = A..C, else 0 
 NEW_INIT_DK = 1, if NEW_LETTER = D..K, else 0 
 NEW_INIT_LR = 1, if NEW_LETTER = L..R, else 0 
 NEW_INIT_SZ = 1, if NEW_LETTER = S..Z, else 0 
 NEW_INIT_CK = 1, if NEW_LETTER = C..K, else 0 
 NEW_INIT_BK = 1, if NEW_LETTER = B..K, else 0 
 NEW_INIT_AB = 1, if NEW_LETTER = A..B, else 0 
 NEW_INIT_A = 1, if NEW_LETTER = A, else 0 
 
3.3 Data-analysis 
 
Most of the statistical analyses have been performed by using IBM SPSS Statistics version 22. 
Test Hypothesis 1 
To test whether changing to an earlier alphabet name leads to a higher abnormal return response in 
the market than changing to a later alphabet name, an event study approach has been undertaken.  
The cumulative abnormal return for firm i around event date t0,i has been related to the number of 
steps up the alphabet (#STEPS) through an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis, using 
equation 5: 
 
CARi,t = α  + γ1  #STEPSi,t + γ2 LOG(FIRM_SIZEi,t) + γ3 PB_RATIO  + ηx IND_DUMMY_x + εi,t  (5) 
Where: 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) = Log (Market Value of Equity at event date t) = Log (#SHARES i,t * SPi,t) 
PB_RATIO  = Price/Book ratio 
IND_DUMMY_x  = Industry dummy variable based on the Fama and French (1997) 48 
                                           Industry classifications with the addition the 49th classification of                  
                                           Computer Hardware and Software that was introduced in the mid  
                                           2000’s. The dummy value is set at 1 for Classification C, 0 for other  
                                           classifications  
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no abnormal return effect linked to an alphabetic name change, 
meaning that γ1 does not differ from 0 in a statistically significant way. The alpha level is set at 0.05.  
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Test Hypothesis 2 
Jacobs (2016) states that the impact of the alphabetic bias is disproportionally strong for companies 
at the beginning of a listing and then decays gradually. In their research, they split the population in 5 
percentiles: 0-5%, 5-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, 75-100%. The letter A already accounts for nearly 10% of 
the names. The second percentile stretches to the letter D, the third to K, the fourth to R. To 
determine whether there is a larger effect for names starting with A, B and C, the abnormal return 
has been regressed on the starting letter of the new name, by using the following regression formula, 
using control variables for the groups D-K, L-R, S-Z 
 
CARi,t =  αi,t  + δ1 NEW_INIT_ACi,t + δ2 LOG(FIRM_SIZE) + δ3 PB_RATIO  + ηx IND_DUMMY_x  
+ δ4 NEW_INIT_DKi,t  + δ5 NEW_INIT_LRi,t + δ6 NEW_INIT_SZi,t + εi,t                             (6) 
Where, 
NEW_INIT_AC = 1 for name starting with letters between A and C and 0 for any other letter 
 
The NEW_INIT_SZi,t has been used as the base dummy. 
To check whether the effect is stronger for name changes to A or B initial letters or to A only, 
regressions has been performed using the variable NEW_INIT_AB and NEW_INIT_A in a similar 
fashion, extending the NEW_INIT_DK accordingly to NEW_INIT_CK and NEW_INT_BK.  
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no abnormal return effect linked to an initial letter of the new 
name, meaning that δ1, δ4, δ5 and δ6 do not differ from 0 in a statistically significant way.  The alpha 
level is set at 0.05. 
 
Test Hypothesis 3 
High visibility has been proxied by firm size. To test hypothesis 5, the dataset has been split into two 
subsets, with the first subset being the firms smaller than the median firm size of the total dataset 
and the second subset larger than the median. The following regression has been performed for the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return for both subsets:   
 
CARi,t =  αi,t  + θ1 LOG(Firm Size) +  θ2 PB_RATIO  + ηx IND_DUMMY_x   + θ3 NEW_INIT_ABi,t  
+ θ4 NEW_INIT_CKi,t  + θ5 NEW_INIT_LRi,t + θ6 NEW_INIT_SZi,t + εi,t                    (7) 
 
 
The null hypothesis is that the firm visibility as proxied by the firm size has no effect on the 
cumulative return, meaning that θ3 for both subsets do not differ in a statistically significant way. The 
alpha level is set at 0.05.  
 
 
Test Hypothesis 4 
To determine whether managers cater for the alphabet bias by choosing a name starting with a letter 
higher up the alphabet, the distribution of the old names and new names over the alphabet has been 
compared.  The average initial letter has been determined by using the following approach: 
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𝐴𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑠 =  
∑ (𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐴𝐿,𝑙 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑅𝐸,𝑙,𝑠)
𝑧
𝑙=𝑎
𝑁𝑠
                                   (8) 
 
Where: 
AV_INITs = Average value of initial letter for sample s (OLD or NEW) 
LETTERVAL,l = Coded letter value (A = 26, B = 25, etc..) = OLD_LETTER# or NEW_LETTER# 
LETTERFRE,l,s = Frequency a name start with the letter in sample s 
Ns = Total number of instances in sample 
An increase in AV_INIT for NEW compared to OLD indicates an average shift up the alphabet. To test 
whether the distribution differences between the old and new names are statistically significant, a 
paired t-test has been performed, where the null hypothesis is that the distributions do not differ. 
The alpha level is set at 0.05. 
 
As Jacobs (2016) indicates, the alphabet bias is most significant in the top 5% of an alphabetic list. 
According to that review this top 5% falls under the letter A. Jacobs provides an initial letter 
distribution. From this letter distribution, the standard deviation has been determined. To test 
whether managers opt more frequently for names starting with the letter A, the percentage of new 
names starting with an A will be compared with the frequency of names starting with an A, that 
Jacobs has calculated. The statistical significance will be determined by comparing the difference in 
percentages with the number of standard deviations. The alpha level has been set at 0.05, which 
means that the null hypothesis, that managers do not favor the letter A as the initial for their new 
company name, will be discarded if the difference is more than 2.47σ.  
 
Test Hypothesis 5 
Jacobs (2016) found that the alphabet bias effect is negatively related to firm visibility as proxied by 
firm size. To test the size effect, a regression analysis has been performed. To account possible other 
independent variables, several dummy control variables have been added to the regression:  
 
#STEPSi,t =  αi,t + β1 LOG(FIRM_SIZE) + β2 EVENT_YEARi,t + β3 PB_RATIO   
+ ηx IND_DUMMY_x  + εi,t                            (9) 
 
Where: 
EVENT_YEAR  = Year event took place 
  
 
The null hypothesis is that no relation exists between the firm visibility as proxied as 
firm size, FIRM_SIZE and the number of letters up the alphabet that the new names 
is positioned compared to the old name. For the null hypothesis, the β1 does not differ 
from 0 in a statistically significant way. The null hypothesis is rejected below an alpha 
level of 0.05. The expected alternative hypothesis is that β1 is negative, indicating 
that firm visibility is negatively related to the alphabet bias. 
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3.4 Methodological Issues 
 
There are four types of validity to consider (http://www.socialresearchmethods.net):  
1. Construct Validity 
2. Internal Validity 
3. External Validity 
4. Conclusion Validity: Reliability 
 
Construct Validity 
The operationalization of the independent and dependent variables has been described in the 
methodology. Firm visibility has been proxied by firm size, though one could argue that firm 
expenditure on marketing will also have an impact. This has not been considered in the regressions 
and could influence the results. 
 
The causal relationship between rational managers catering for the irrational alphabetic bias is 
supported by the literature. The market response to an alphabetic name change  as off the first date 
of trading under the new name, is expected to be irrational, driving by cosmetic effects, as per the 
literature on name change effects, as Cooper (2001), Cooper (2005a, 2005b), Green and Jame (2013) 
and Lin (2016).  
 
Internal Validity 
The causal relations between the dependent and independent variables have been analyzed where 
possible by regression and distribution comparison. 
 
External validity 
The analysis has been performed for the US financial market. The European markets may respond 
differently. Care must be taken to extrapolate these findings to other markets. Jacobs (2016) 
indicates that the Japanese financial market is not affected by the alphabetic bias, as stocks have a 
unique numeric code. This code does lead to a ranking effect; however, managers  are not free to 
change the code, which means that Japan could not act as a suitable robustness test market for 
catering name changes.  
 
Indian market data on name changes is readily available (http://www.moneycontrol.com/stocks/  
marketinfo/namechange/), allowing for a robustness check on Hypothesis 4 for external validity. 
 
Conclusion Validity: Reliability 
Reliability is tested for the different analyses. For hypothesis 4, the alphabetic distribution of the 
names has been tested by using the standard deviation. The other four hypotheses have been tested 
using a regression approach and a t-test. 
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4. Findings 
First the descriptive statistics will be reviewed. Then, as the decision of a manager to change the 
company name precedes the investor response to the name changes, hypotheses 4 and 5 relating to 
the catering behavior of managers will be explored, before finally reviewing the investor response of 
hypotheses 1,2 and 3.  
4.0  Descriptive statistics 
The dataset consists of 91 name changes. The cases included have the following characteristics: 
Table 1: 1999 – 2015 Dataset characteristics 
  Nature of Name 
Change 
Stock Market  Firm Size2 
 Sample 
Size 
Adoption Radical NASDAQ NYSE Different 
Industries 
<1 b$ >1 b$ 
Dataset 91 38 53 52 39 29 65 26 
 
The trend appears to be that smaller companies are quicker to change their names. This can probably 
be attributed to a combination of their names being less established, the costs involved being lower 
and the fact that there are generally a higher number of smaller than larger firms. Determining the 
precise cause falls outside the scope of this research.  
Reviewing the connection between the size3 of the company involved and the nature of the name 
change, gives the following cross tabulation: 
Table 2: Company size versus Nature of name change 
  
NATURE 
Total Radical Adoption 
Size Small 41 24 65 
Large 12 14 26 
Total 53 38 91 
The overview indicates that smaller companies are relatively more inclined to radically change their 
names, where large companies opt more often to adopt a strong and established market brand as 
their new name, potentially aimed at benefitting from the name recognition. 
  
                                                                 
2
 Based on market capitalization at the time of the event date 
3
 Small is a market capitalization below 1 bil l ion USD and Large is above 1 bil l ion USD 
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For each of the name change cases, a set of data has been collected. The characteristics of these 
variables have been summarized below: 
Table 3: Variable characteristics  
 Alphabetic 
Steps  
(Pos i tive 
towards  
A) - 
#STEPS 
Rel . Steps - 
#STEPS_REL 
Fi rm Size 
(in m$) – 
FIRM_SIZE 
LOG (Fi rm Size) 
- 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) 
P/B Ratio  
- 
PB_RATIO 
 
Event Year  
- 
EVENT_YEAR 
Cum. Abn. 
Return 
Announce-
ment 
Date - 
CAR_6A 
(in %) 
Cum. Abn. 
Return 
Trading 
Date - 
CAR_6T 
(in %) 
Mean 1.3 0.2 4,216 2.5 4.4 2008.8 0.3 -1.1 
Median 2.0 0.3 250 2.4 1.8 2013.0 0.6 -0.9 
St. Dev 12.1 0.7 15,872 0.9 7.4 6.4 8.5 9.6 
Min -23 -1 3 0.4 0.02 1999 -28.2 -29.7 
Max 22 1 135,053 5.1 51.4 2015 23.7 21.0 
Skewness -0.2 -0.3 6.8 0.6 4.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 
Kurtos is -1.0 -1.5 52.7 0.1 19.6 -1.6 2.2 1.2 
(A = Adoption, R = Radical) 
 
The following test of normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov with Lilliefors Significance Correction) have 
been performed (85 degrees of freedom): 
Table 4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality 
 Statis tic Signi ficance 
#STEPS 0.086 0.097 
#STEPS_REL 0.148 0.000 
FIRM_SIZE 0.403 0.000 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) 0.094 0.046 
PB_RATIO 0.289 0.000 
CAR11_A 0.069 0.200 
CAR6_A 0.106 0.013 
CAR6_T 0.111 0.007 
 
With this test, a non-significant result, i.e. significance larger than 0.05, indicates normality. This 
indicates that the steps and Cumulative Abnormal Return for the 11 days around the announcement 
event date (CAR11_A) are normally distributed. The LOG(FIRM_SIZE) is nearly normally distributed. 
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In the dataset analyzed, the distribution over the different industries is as follows:  
Figure 2: Industry Classification distribution 
 
The graph shows that most firms in the dataset can be categorized as Pharmaceutical companies (9), 
followed by Software companies (8), Finance (7), Apparel (6), Banks/ Oil&Gas/ Business Services/ 
Restaurants (all 5). Industry Class 13 – Pharmaceutical has been used as the base dummy against 
which the other relevant classes are regressed in the analyses. 
  
4.1 When rebranding the company name managers tend to choose a new name 
that is earlier in the alphabet. 
 
The shift in distribution over the entire alphabet has been numerically analyzed as follows:  
 
𝐴𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑠 =  
∑ (𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐴𝐿,𝑙 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑅𝐸,𝑙,𝑠)
𝑧
𝑙=𝑎
𝑁𝑠
                                   (8) 
 
Where: 
AV_INITs = Average value of initial letter for sample s (OLD or NEW) 
LETTERVAL,l = Coded letter value (A = 26, B = 25, etc..) = OLD_LETTER# or NEW_LETTER# 
LETTERFRE,l,s = Frequency a name start with the letter in sample s 
Ns = Total number of instances in sample 
An increase in AV_INIT for NEW compared to OLD indicates an average shift up the alphabet.  
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This analysis gives the following result: 
Table 5: Shift in initials 
 NEW OLD #Steps 
AV_INITs (All) 17.4 16.1 1.3 
AV_INITs (Adoption) 16.7 17.3 -0.7 
AV_INITs (Radical) 18.0 15.2 2.8 
 
The results show that on average the name changes shift the names towards the start of the 
alphabet by over one letter. This is mainly the case in radical name changes, where the shift is nearly 
3 letters. For adoption name changes, the shift is the other way, towards a lower ranking.  A paired t-
test shows that the difference between the result found of 1.3 and the null hypothesis, that there is 
no difference between the two means, is statistically not significant (t=1.1, df=90, sig.=0.292). The 
shifts for the adoption and radical name change subsets are neither statistically significantly. 
Jacobs (2016) analyzed the initial letters of company names and compared those with the words 
generally used in the English literature, as analyzed using Google Ngram. This comparison as seen in 
figure 3 shows that in general company names start more often with the letter A (and C) than words 
generally do in the English language, which suggests an alphabetic preference on the part of 
managers: 
Figure 3: Comparison initial letter distribution US Companies and English Words 
 
 
To determine whether the collected dataset shows the typical distribution of the initial letters as 
Jacobs (2016) has determined for US companies in general, the two have been compared in figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Comparison initial letter distribution Old Names 1999-2015 dataset and US Companies  
 
 
Figure 4 shows that the companies in the dataset generally had an alphabetic name distribution that 
was comparable to the general distribution for US firms, with some exceptions. In the dataset, for 
example company names starting with “E” seem to be lagging, which is interesting as a sizeable 
number of the companies from the dataset opt for the letter “E” as the new starting letter.  In 
addition, the letter “A” seems to occur more often as an initial letter compared to the general initial 
letter distribution. This difference is found not to be statistically significant. 
The alphabetic shift in initials of the name changes has been analyzed for the 1999 – 2015 dataset 
giving the distribution shown in figure 5:  
Figure 5: Comparison initial letter distribution Old and New Names 1999-2015 dataset 
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The effect of changing to a new name starting with a letter that ranges from A to E is pronounced. In 
the old names, 30.8 % has a name starting with a letter between A and E. In the new names, this has 
increased to 48.4%.  
The average frequency over the alphabet of company names is 100/26 = 3.85%. For the distribution 
of all company name reviewed by Jacobs the standard deviation is 2.8%. The frequency for the letter 
A in the company population (Jacobs, 2016) is 9.6%. For the 1999 – 2015 dataset, frequency for the 
letter A is 20.9%, giving a spread of (20.9 – 9.6)/2.8 = 4.0 σ, giving a 99.99% confidence level that the 
deviation is statistically significant. For the dataset reviewed, managers show an inclination to 
change their companies’ names to a name starting with the letter A.4 
 
4.2 Smaller firms are more inclined to seek a higher alphabetical ranking. 
 
To test whether managers of small firms are more inclined to change the name to a name starting 
with A or B, the dataset has been regressed using equation 9: 
#STEPSi,t = αi,t + β1 LOG(FIRM_SIZE) + β2 EVENT_YEARi,t + β3 PB_RATIO  + ζx IND_DUMMY_x + εi,t     (9)                 
     
The 49 industry classifications have been converted to 49 dummies. Only those dummies are 
included in the regression of which the frequency is more than 0, reducing the dummies from 49 to 
295. IND_DUMMY-13 (Pharmaceutical Products, 9 companies) has been used as the reference 
dummy variable. The regression for all the name changes gives the results in the following table, 
which has been reduced to the variables that are of interest. The full regression table can be found in  
Appendix II. 
Table 6: Regression 4.2.1 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 
Model 91 0.336 -0.12  
Regression Results (unstandardized) 
 Alpha/ 
Beta 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. 
(Constant) -613.6 523.6 -1.2 0.246 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) 0.8 2.0 0.4 0.697 
EVENT_YEAR 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.251 
PB_RATIO 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.205 
IND_DUMMY_46 23.9 10.4 2.3 0.025 
 
The analysis shows that the firm size has a positive correlation to the number of steps towards the 
start of the alphabet instead of the expected negative effect. The move towards the start of the 
alphabet is more pronounced in recent years. A higher P/B ratio is moderately positively related to 
                                                                 
4
 The 1999 – 2015 dataset has been compared with the Wu/Green dataset to determine whether the method 
of data collection has influenced the cases collected. This review is included in Appendix I. 
5
 Please refer to Appendix III  for an overview of the industry classifications 
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the steps up the alphabet. None of these correlations are statistically significant. Industry Category 
46 (Insurance; 2 companies) has a very strong statistically significant impact on the number of steps. 
The R square (R2=0.3) indicates a moderate fit.  The ANOVA F-test, F(31,59)=1.0, confirms that at a 
significance level of 0.53, the model is not statistically significant. 
Regressions split based on the nature of the results did not yield notably different results.  
For further analysis, the dataset has been split into two subsets, with the first subset being the firms 
smaller than the median firm size of 250 million USD and the second subset larger than the median. 
This gives two subsets with 46 and 45 observations respectively. Regressing the data for each subset 
gives the following results (concise):  
Table 7: Regression 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
 Small Firms (<250 m$) Large Firms (>250 m$) 
 Number of 
Observations R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 Number of 
Observations R 
Square 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
 
Model 46 0.712 0.461  45 0.391 -0.411  
Regression Results (unstandardized) 
 Alpha/ 
Beta 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. Alpha/ 
Beta 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. 
(Constant) -830.3 568.6 -1.5 0.157 -66.0 1,064.4 -0.1 0.951 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -10.2 5.6 -1.8 0.082 -0.9 5.5 -0.2 0.875 
EVENT_YEAR 0.4 0.3 1.5 0.153 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.936 
PB_RATIO 0.6 0.2 3.0 0.006 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.981 
IND_DUMMY_1 25.0 8.7 2.9 0.008     
IND_DUMMY_10 13.3 5.5 2.4 0.024     
IND_DUMMY_21 23.6 6.7 3.5 0.002     
IND_DUMMY_22 25.9 8.7 3.0 0.006     
IND_DUMMY_36 19.2 5.3 3.6 0.001     
IND_DUMMY_41 15.5 7.1 2.2 0.037     
IND_DUMMY_45 13.8 6.1 2.3 0.031     
IND_DUMMY_48 16.0 5.1 3.2 0.004     
 
This analysis would suggest that for smaller firms there is a larger tendency to move the name up the 
alphabetical ranking, though this is not statistically significant at the 5% level , but at the 10% level. A 
higher P/B ratio is positively correlated in a statistically significant way to the number of steps for 
small firms. In addition, there is a positive correlation between the event year and the number of 
steps closer to the start of the alphabet for smaller firms. This would indicate that smaller firms 
increasingly move their company name up the alphabet ranking as time progresses. For a number of 
industry classifications, there is a positive correlation that is significant at the 5% level. Why that is 
the case for these particular industry classifications, falls outside the scope of this research.  
For the large firms, there is negative correlation between the firm size and the steps up the alphabet, 
though this effect is far from statistically significant. The ANOVA F-test for small firms, F(21,24)=2.8, 
sig. 0.008, shows that the model is statistically significant. The R squared (R2=0.7) confirms a good fit. 
For large firms, this is not the case: F(25,19)=0.5, sig. 0.95, with the fit being moderate (R2=0.4) 
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The analysis of small firm subset supports the hypothesis that smaller firms are more inclined to 
choose an alphabetically more favorable initial letter than a large one, with this being strongly the 
case in 8 industry classifications, representing 22 firms.  
 
4.3 Changing to an earlier alphabet name leads to a higher abnormal return 
response in the market than changing to a later alphabet name. 
 
For each name change, two event studies were performed. The first uses the announcement date as 
the event date. The second event date is the first date of trading under the new name as announced 
in press releases. This date is the first date that a retail investors scrolling through an alphabetical 
order of potential investment opportunities will come across the new name.  
The cumulative abnormal returns were regressed using equation 5: 
CARi,t = α  + γ1  #STEPSi,t + γ2 LOG(FIRM_SIZEi,t) + γ3 PB_RATIO  + ηx IND_DUMMY_x + εi,t  (5) 
,where IND_DUMMY_13 is the reference dummy variable. 
The data has been regressed around the event (announcement/first trading) date, using the t=0;t+5 
event study, as these give the best ANOVA F-test results. The regression results (condensed) of both 
event studies are presented in the table below. The full tables of results can be found in Appendix II: 
Table 8: Regression 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
Date Announcement First Trading 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 
Model 91 0.203 -0.216  91 0.368 0.035  
Regression Results (unstandardized) 
 Alpha/ 
Gamma 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. Alpha/ 
Gamma 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.0 4.4 0.5 0.650 -4.7 4.4 -1.1 0.291 
#STEPS 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.306 0.2 0.1 1.7 0.095 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -1.4 1.5 -0.9 0.369 0.4 1.5 0.3 0.783 
PB_RATIO -0.3 0.2 -1.7 0.094 -0.1 0.2 -0.7 0.508 
IND_DUMMY_9     13.3 6.4 2.1 0.044 
IND_DUMMY_22     -21.9 10.4 -2.1 0.039 
IND_DUMMY_44     12.1 5.5 2.2 0.032 
 
For the announcement date, the correlation between #STEPS and the Cumulative Abnormal Return is 
weakly positive. Larger firms are penalized for the name change. The P/B ratio is negatively 
correlated to the CAR. None of the correlations are statistically significant. The lack of significance of 
the model is confirmed by the ANOVA F-test, F(31,59) = 0.48, giving a p-level of 0.99. In addition, the 
model fit (R2=0.2) is weak. 
For the first date of trading, the correlation between #STEPS and the Cumulative Abnormal Return is 
as weak as around the announcement date. This result is significant at the 10% level. Larger firms see 
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some reward for the name change. The P/B ratio doesn’t seem to have a correlation with the CAR 
around the trading date. None of the correlations above are statistically significant above.  
For two industry classifications, there is a statistically significant and strong reward for a name 
change on the trading date compared to the base industry classification 13 Pharmaceutical Products. 
These are 9 (Consumer Goods, 3 companies) and 44 (Restaurants, Hotels and Motels, 5 companies). 
The company in the classification 22(Electrical Equipment, 1 company) is strongly penalized.  
The lack of significance of the model is confirmed by the ANOVA F-test, F(31,59) = 1.1, giving a p-level 
of 0.36. The data fitting is moderate at R2=0.4. 
The regression following equation 5 is based on the absolute number of steps up or down the 
alphabet. A change from C to A would give +2 steps, as would for Z to X, but when a company name 
starts with the letter Z, the potential for moving up the alphabet is larger. However, the move up the 
alphabet, closer to the start, would be most noticeable to retail investors, if the move is a relatively 
large one. If the retail investor is not following a company and purely starting at the top of an 
alphabetical list, name changes further down the alphabet may escape their attention. As a result, 
the retail investor would not respond to the name change. 
Regressing against relative steps (#STEPS_REL), being the actual number of steps of the move divided 
by the maximum number of steps available in the chosen direction, gives no statistically significant 
result for the announcement date, but it does for the first date of trading:  
Table 9: Regression 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 
Date Announcement First Trading 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 
Model 91 0.197 -0.226  91 0.387 0.065  
Regression Results (unstandardized) 
 Alpha/ 
Gamma 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. Alpha/ 
Gamma 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.2 4.3 0.3 0.783 -6.1 4.3 -1.4 0.159 
#STEPS_REL 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.441 3.7 1.7 2.2 0.031 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -1.2 1.5 -0.8 0.428 0.7 1.5 0.5 0.638 
PB_RATIO -0.3 0.2 -1.6 0.113 -0.1 0.2 -0.6 0.582 
IND_DUMMY_9     13.5 6.3 2.1 0.037 
IND_DUMMY_22     -20.4 10.0 2.01 0.045 
IND_DUMMY_28     23.7 10.2 2.3 0.023 
IND_DUMMY_44     12.7 5.4 2.3 0.023 
 
The regression shows that around the first date of trading there is strong positive correlation 
between the relative steps up or down the alphabet and the cumulative abnormal return. The 
correlation is statistically significant at a p-level of 0.031. This finding implies that managers are more 
rewarded, the closer their new company name ends up to the top of the alphabetical list of 
companies, which confirms the hypothesis.   
The ANOVA F-test gives F(31,50) = 1.2, giving a p-level of 0.27, which is not significant at the 5% level. 
The model gives a moderate fit (R2=0.4). 
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4.4  Corporate name changes to names starting with an A, B or C lead to higher 
abnormal returns that changes to a name starting with a letter further down the 
alphabet. 
 
This hypothesis has been tested using equation 6: 
CARi,t = αi,t  + δ1 NEW_INIT_ACi,t + δ2 LOG(FIRM_SIZE) + δ3 PB_RATIO   + ηx IND_DUMMY_x  
+ δ4 NEW_INIT_DKi,t  + δ5 NEW_INIT_LRi,t + δ6 NEW_INIT_SZi,t + εi,t    (6) 
The NEW_INIT_SZi,t has been used as the reference dummy variable. IND_DUMMY_13 is the 
reference dummy variable, for the industry dummies. 
The data has been regressed around both event dates, using the t=0;t+5 event study. The regression 
results (concise) are presented in the table below. The full tables of results can be found in Appendix 
II: 
Table 10: Regression 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 
Date Announcement First Trading 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 
Model 91 0.224 -0.225  91 0.376 0.015  
Regression Results (unstandardized) 
 Alpha/ 
Delta/Eta 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. Alpha/ 
Delta/Eta 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. 
(Constant) -0.6 4.8 -0.1 0.903 -9.7 4.9 -2.0 0.050 
NEW_INIT_AC 1.5 3.0 0.5 0.609 5.3 3.0 1.8 0.085 
NEW_INIT_DK 0.8 3.4 0.2 0.818 4.7 3.5 1.4 0.175 
NEW_INIT_LR 5.6 3.7 1.5 0.131 4.9 3.8 1.3 0.195 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -1.0 1.5 -0.7 0.495 0.8 1.5 0.6 0.582 
PB_RATIO 0.2 0.2 -1.5 0.151 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.692 
IND_DUMMY_9     13.5 6.7 2.0 0.048 
IND_DUMMY_28     24.8 10.6 2.3 0.024 
IND_DUMMY_44     11.5 5.7 2.0 0.047 
 
For the announcement date, there is a positive correlation between the initial letters in the AC, DK 
and LR range compared to the SZ range, with LR offering the strongest effect. These results however 
are far from statistically significant. For the trading date, these effects in comparison to changing the 
initial to S..Z, are even more pronounced. Firms choosing a new initial in the S to Z letter range for 
companies in the Pharmaceutical industry see a negative effect (p<0.05).  Larger firms are strongly 
penalized for the name change around the announcement date, potentially due to the affect bias for 
the old name, but then rewarded around the trading date. The P/B ratio is weakly correlated to the 
CAR for both event dates. None of these latter correlations are statistically significant.  
The ANOVA F-test, for the announcement date: F(33,57) = 0.5, gives a p-level of 1.0 and for trading 
date: F(33,57) = 1.0, a p-level of 0.4, showing a lack of significance of the model as a whole. The 
model fit is weak for the announcement date (R2=0.2) and moderate for the trading date (R2=0.4). 
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The band of the first initial dummy has been narrowed to AB for both event dates. For the 
announcement, this does not give statistically relevant results. On the trading date, the narrowing of 
the dummy to AB does give a statistical significant result. The full tables of results can be found in 
Appendix II, Table 22: 
Table 11: Regression 4.4.3 
Date First Trading 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 
Model 91 0.390 0.037  
Regression Results (unstandardized) 
 Alpha/ 
Delta 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. 
(Constant) -9.5 4.8 -2.0 0.053 
NEW_INIT_AB 8.2 3.3 2.2 0.034 
NEW_INIT_CK 3.3 3.2 1.0 0.305 
NEW_INIT_LR 4.6 3.7 1.2 0.220 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) 0.7 1.5 0.4 0.670 
PB_RATIO 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.907 
IND_DUMMY_9 14.7 6.6 2.2 0.029 
IND_DUMMY_28 26.1 10.4 2.5 0.015 
 
Following this regression for the trading date, the choice for a new name starting with an A or a B is 
significantly associated with a higher CAR around the trading date, ceteris paribus.  This correlation is 
statistically significant at a p-level of 0.034, so below the 5% alpha level.  This result is in line with the 
findings from regression 4.3.4. For the ranges C..K and L..R the correlations remain strongly positive, 
though not statistically significant. For industry classes 9 and 28, the positive impact remains 
significant. The impact of the P/B ratio on the correlation remains weak and not significant.  The 
ANOVA F-test for the model gives F(33,57) = 1.1, giving a p-level of 0.37. The corresponding model fit 
is moderate at R2=0.4 
 
4.5 Large firms will not experience an abnormal return response to an earlier 
alphabetic name change. 
 
To determine the effect of firm size, the dataset has been split into two subsets, with the first subset 
being the firms smaller than the median firm size of 250 million USD and the second subset larger 
than the media. This gives two subsets with 46 and 45 observations respectively. The following 
regression has been performed for the Cumulative Abnormal Return around the Trading date for 
both subsets:   
CARi,t =  αi,t  + θ1 LOG(Firm Size) +  θ2 PB_RATIO  + ηx IND_DUMMY_x   + θ3 NEW_INIT_ABi,t  
+ θ4 NEW_INIT_CKi,t  + θ5 NEW_INIT_LRi,t + θ6 NEW_INIT_SZi,t + εi,t                     (7) 
 
,where IND_DUMMY_13 and NEW_INIT-SZ are the reference dummy variables. 
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The distribution of the name changes over the firm size brackets is as follows:  
Table 12: Initial distribution versus Firm size 
 Small (<250 m$) Large (>250 m$) Total 
NEW_INIT_AB 7 16 23 
NEW_INIT_CK 20 11 31 
NEW_INIT_LR 9 6 15 
NEW_INIT_SZ 10 12 22 
 46 45 91 
 
The regression results for the First Date of Trading (condensed) are presented in the table below. The 
full tables of results can be found in Appendix II: 
Table 13: Regression 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 
Size < 250 million USD >250 million USD 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 Number of 
Observations 
R 
Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
 
Model 45 0.569 0.119  46 0.592 -0.055  
Regression Results (unstandardized) 
 Alpha/ 
Eta/Theta 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. Alpha/ 
Delta 
St.  
Error 
t Sig. 
(Constant) -9.9 14.5 -0.7 0.504 -14.8 10.6 -1.4 0.181 
NEW_INIT_AB 14.9 7.0 2.1 0.044 1.8 3.6 0.5 0.628 
NEW_INIT_CK 5.1 6.0 0.9 0.402 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.999 
NEW_INIT_LR 7.3 6.7 1.1 0.290 0.9 4.8 0.2 0.857 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -1.6 7.8 -0.2 0.842 3.1 2.4 1.3 0.212 
PB_RATIO 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.269 -0.6 0.3 -2.5 0.024 
IND_DUMMY_9 23.4 9.4 2.5 0.021     
      
For small firms, the reward of switching to a new name starting with an A or B is very pronounced. 
For large firms, the effect is a lot weaker, indicating that small firms do indeed benefit  from such an 
alphabetical change, where large firms benefit less so, confirming the hypothesis. Care must be taken 
with the results of the regression for the large firms however as they are not statistically significant, 
apart from the P/B ratio, where the findings seem to show that larger companies with higher P/B 
ratios are penalized for changing their name. The explanation for this correlation falls outside the 
scope of this research. 
For the small firm dataset, the ANOVA F-test, F(23,22) = 1.3, gives p-level of 0.29. For the large firm 
dataset, the ANOVA F-test, F(27,17) = 0.9, gives p-level of 0.59. Both models give a strong fit (R2=0.6). 
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5. Conclusions, discussion and recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
Investors face an overwhelming choice of investment options. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(Jensen, 1978) suggests that rational investors evaluate all options on their full merit. In practice, less 
experienced investors resort to heuristics and shortcuts. Their decisions are influenced by names 
(fluency: Green, 2013; alphabetic bias: Itzkowitz, 2016, Jacobs, 2016) and name changes (dot.com 
additions: Cooper, 2001; dot.com rejections: Cooper, 2005b; association with hot styles: Cooper, 
2005a; association with the oil or petroleum: Lin, 2016). Search algorithms used by the decision-
makers are based on a sequential search pattern of lists, which leads to a ranking or primacy effect 
(Carney, 2012). With alphabetic listings, this effect becomes the alphabetic bias. Itzkowitz (2016) and 
Jacobs (2016) have found that this bias results in an increased liquidity, stock turnover and thereby 
firm value for firms in the top of alphabetical listings.  
Investor behavior 
Following the findings of Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016), and the potential for irrational market 
responses to cosmetic names changes, this research has looked at how the market responds to 
alphabetical name changes. It has been found that investors exhibit an irrational response to 
alphabetic name changes around the start of the company trading under the new name. An 
increased relative move up the alphabetical ranking leads to a larger Cumulative Abnormal Return. 
Companies changing their names to start with an “A” or “B” experience a positive cumulative 
abnormal return. This supports the suggestion from Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016), that 
improving the alphabetical ranking of a company is a low-cost method to increase the firm’s value. 
Smaller firms seem to benefit more from the alphabetic company name changes than larger firms. 
This effect is however not statistically significant.  
Manager behavior  
Nguyen (2013) describes how managers cater to irrational market behavior with the intention of 
boosting the company’s value. This research has explored whether rational managers cater to the 
irrational alphabetic bias of investors by moving company names up the alphabetical ranking. The 
analysis of the dataset of 91 observations of name changes during the period 1999 to 2015 shows  an 
upward shift by over one letter. For radical name changes, this shift is nearly three letters.  A 
statistically significant percentage of nearly 21% opted for a new name starting with an “A”. From 
this it can be concluded that managers consider the alphabetical ranking in their choice of  a new 
name and target to be on top of the alphabetical list. The choice for an alphabetic name change is 
influenced by the firm size. Smaller companies are more inclined to move their company name to the 
top of the alphabetical listing than larger companies.  
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
Investor behavior 
The positive cumulative abnormal return found in response to companies moving up the alphabetical 
ranking supports the hypothesis that investors are affected by the alphabetic bias where company 
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name changes are concerned as well. This builds on the findings by Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs 
(2016), that show the effects of the alphabetic bias for existing company names. The cumulative 
abnormal return response is in line with the findings by Barber (2008) and can be attributed to the 
increased salience after the company started trading under the new name.    
Both Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016) found that the alphabetic bias affects the top of the 
alphabetic list in the range A to C most. This effect is also found for the name changes, where both a 
relative larger move up the ranking and switching to a new initial A or B correlate positively to the 
cumulative abnormal return. The regression has been performed for the cumulative abnormal 
returns over the period t=0;t=5 days. The same regression has been performed for t-5;t+5 and t-
1;t+2. Interestingly, the t-1;t+2 regression did not give a significant correlation, whereas the t-5;t+5 
regression gave comparable results as for the period t=0;t=5.  This seems to indicate that the effect 
starts to kick in a few days after the company has started to trade under its new name (t+3;t+5). A 
further review of event studies around the trading date over the period t=3;t+10 may confirm the 
delayed effect found. 
Name changes are generally known in advance of the first trading date under the new name and any 
expected benefits of the name change, such as an increased firm value, would have been factored 
into the stock price instantly as suggested by the Efficient Market Hypothesis posited by Jensen 
(1978). Since the name changes from the dataset predate the Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016) 
research on the alphabetic bias, no explicit market reaction in response to the alphabetic bias could 
be expected around the announcement date. A temporary increase in visibility due to press releases 
and news items could increase salience and thereby lead to a short-term abnormal response, but this 
response would be independent of the alphabetical shift of the name . The data shows a small but 
statistically insignificant, positive effect around the announcement date, which could be related to 
the temporary increase in salience. The fact that an abnormal positive response only occurs when 
firms start to trade under the new name and not around the announcement date means the investor 
response is related to the ranking effect and therefore not a rational one.  
The moderation effect of firm size has been analyzed. Where Itzkowitz (2016) finds no impact of firm 
size or firm visibility as proxied by advertising expenditures, on the alphabetic bias, the research by 
Jacobs (2016) claims a negative correlation between the alphabetic bias and firm visibility, as proxied 
for by firm size. The findings of this research tend to support Jacob’s claim of the effect of firm size, 
with small firms benefiting more than large firms from the irrational investor response to an 
alphabetical name change. However, it must be noted that the firm size results are not statistically 
significant and care must be taken in drawing any solid conclusions from these findings. 
Manager behavior  
This study confirms that managers do indeed opt for the top of the alphabetical ranking, by choosing 
a company name that starts with the letter A. However, as these name changes took place before 
research showed that the alphabetic bias leads to increased firm value (Itzkowitz, 2016; Jacobs, 
2016), it cannot be claimed that the alphabetically more favorable name change is made on 
assumption that it will lead to an increased company value as a result of the alphabetic bias. The 
decision could have been driven by the intuition that a top ranking will offer benefits. As the letter A 
carries an affect heuristic (Ang, 2010) it is linked to higher quality.  The resulting enhanced salience, 
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in line with Tversky (1973), would make this a rational strategy, which Itzkowitz and Jacobs have 
shown to pay off. 
The percentage of cases in which companies change to a new name starting with the letter A is 
substantially higher in the 1999-2015 database in comparison to the Wu/Green database and the 
Jacobs (2016) analysis of US company names. As only surviving companies have been included in the 
1999 – 2015 dataset, this could suggest that having a company name that starts with the letter A 
enhances the survival chances of said company. Whether this is the case, falls outside the scope of 
this research. 
The firm size moderation found by Jacobs (2016) for the alphabetic bias is confirmed by the findings 
for the moderation on name changes. Large firms with market valuations over 250 million USD hardly 
look to improve their alphabetic ranking, where smaller firms have a stronger inclination to do so. 
 
5.3. Recommendations for practitioners 
 
For investors 
This research confirms that investors favor stocks that move higher up the alphabetical list, in line 
with the findings by Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016). For name changes improving the 
alphabetical ranking, in particular those changing their initial to “A” or “B”, a positive abnormal 
return can be expected upon the company starting to trade under its new name, if no other company 
or market information is to counter the effect. With name changes generally being announced in 
advance, investors can benefit from this phenomenon by acquiring such stock before the first date of 
trading under the new name.    
For managers 
Jacobs (2016) describes that changing the company name to one starting with the letter “A”, is one 
of the cheapest solutions available to managers to increase the company’s value. Itzkowitz (2016) 
makes a similar suggestion that improving the alphabetical ranking is “a relatively  low-cost method 
for improving both trading volume and market value”.  This research confirms that especially smaller 
firms benefit from moving their company to a higher alphabetical ranking.  The market responds 
favorably to such a change after the start of the trading under the new name. This supports the 
suggestions that changing the company name is indeed a relatively straightforward way of increasing 
the company value. Therefore, when a company, especially a smaller one, does intend to change its 
name, it would be recommended all else being equal, to consider choosing a new name that 
improves the alphabetical ranking. As more firms may take the same approach, opting for a name 
starting with “Aa” may keep the firm ahead in the ranking for longer. Care should be taken however 
not to compromise the fluency of the name as the fluency effect as described by Green and Jame 
(2013) may counter the benefits of the alphabetical ranking.    
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5.4. Recommendations for further research 
 
Limitations  
An important limitation of this research has been the availability of financial data for the name 
changes reviewed. The use of public data sources, principally Yahoo! Finance has limited the research 
to those firms that have survived, which introduces a bias. It would be therefore recommended to 
repeat this study using subscription databases like Thomson Reuters, CRSP or Datastream. 
An additional limitation has been the accuracy of the announcement date for the name change. For 
this research, the first date at which there was a public Internet-based mention of a new name was 
chosen, as this was the first date that this information had become public. Open internet sources 
have been used to collect this information. As most name changes date back quite some time, the 
accuracy of the announcement date, or maybe better described as the first date that the intention 
shows up in the public domain, is questionable.  Websites carrying earlier mention of the intention 
may not be available anymore, which introduces a certain news survival bias.  As a result, the 
announcement date is less certain than the first date of trading under the new name, which has 
generally been captured and recorded quite accurately.  This potential lack of accuracy may have 
impacted the analyses around the announcement dates.  In this research, the focus has been on 
irrational behavior by investors, so main date of interest is the trading date .  
Suggestions for further research 
Itzkowitz (2016) and Jacobs (2016) have found that due to irrational behavior of retail investors, the 
alphabetic bias leads to increased trading volume and liquidity, which in turn results in an increased 
company value. As the name change adds value, a positive market response to the announcement of 
an alphabetically more favorable name change would be rational, as from 2016 onwards the market 
is or could be aware of the company value enhancing effects of the alphabetic bias. It is suggested to 
repeat the study for the period after 2016 to review whether an alphabetical name change leads to 
an abnormal response on both the announcement date and the first date of trading.  
The research has been performed for the US stock markets NYSE and NASDAQ. Extension of the 
research to other stock markets, like the Indian, European, Canadian or Australian ones, is suggested, 
to determine whether the alphabetic bias is more globally spread over cultures using an alphabetic 
order for their stock market listings. 
A noticeable number of companies opt to change their names to start with an E (see also Appendix I). 
This could be linked to the preference for an increase in name fluency as researched by Green 
(2013). An alternative explanation could be the suggestion of high technology involvement as found 
for example in E-bikes, E-books, E-readers and E-Learning. The phenomenon is put forward for 
further exploration. 
The name change observations suggest a relative larger chance of survival for companies with a 
higher alphabetical ranking. Is that a quirk brought on by the limitations of the data collection or 
does a name starting with an A really increase the survival chances of a company? Further research 
may prove a correlation between company naming and survival chances.   
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Appendix I – Comparison 1999 – 2015 dataset with dataset Wu/Green 
 
The percentage of new names starting with an A in the 1999- 2015 dataset is significantly higher than 
the percentage of US companies overall whose names start with an A. Potentially, this effect has 
been enhanced by data survival bias.  In the collection of the data, open sources like Yahoo! Finance 
were used. The firms included in the dataset are the firms that are currently still trading, and for 
which Yahoo! Finance offers the return data needed for the event studies around the announcement 
date and the first date of trading. If companies do benefit from an alphabetical name change, this 
may thus increase their survival chances, thereby impacting the data. This bias could be more 
significant the longer ago the event date. S&P 500 firm lifespans are now around 15 years 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-16611040. For listed companies, Daepp (2015) reports a half-
life of 10 years, meaning that after 10 years, 50% of the companies won’t exist anymore. So, for all 
the firms included in the dataset for the year 2007, another equal number haven’t survived, 
assuming that changing a company name does not influence the survival rate of a company. For the 
firms from 1999, the number of firms that didn’t survive this long nearly goes up to three times as 
high. The new names distribution could potentially indicate that changing the name to an early 
alphabet initial letter has increased the chances of survival for the names involved. Jacobs (2016) and 
Itzkowitz (2016) show that the alphabetic bias does increase the value of a company, which would 
support the suggestion that it also increases the survival chances. 
To assess whether the dataset has been influenced by the described data survival bias, the 1999-
2015 dataset name changes has been compared to the combined Wu (2010) and Green (2013) 
datasets for the period 1999 – 2008, for the name changes marked Radical and Adoption. This 
comparison is captured in figure 6: 
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Figure 6: Comparison initial letter distribution Old and New Names Wu/Green dataset  
 
Over the 216 name changes in the Wu/Green dataset, the graph shows an increase in the letter A, 
but this increase is less pronounced that for the 1999-2015 dataset. This could potentially indicate 
that changing the name to an early alphabet initial letter has increased the chances of survival for the 
names involved. Jacobs (2016) and Itzkowitz (2016) show that the alphabetic bias does increase the 
value of a company, which would support the theory that it also increases the survival chances. 
Interestingly, both the Wu/Green dataset and the 1999-2015 dataset show a significant increase in 
companies changing their names to start with an E. This could be linked to the preference for an 
increase in name fluency as researched by Green (2013). An alternative explanation could be the 
suggestion of high technology involvement related to the initial E as found for example in Ebikes, 
Ebooks, Ereaders and E-Learning. Further investigation of this effect falls outside the scope of this 
research. 
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Appendix II – SPSS Outputs 
 
Hypothesis 2 $4.2 
 
Table 14: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.2.1 
  
Unstandardized Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -613.654 523.577  -1.172 .246 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) .789 2.019 .060 .391 .697 
EVENT_YEARA .302 .261 .161 1.159 .251 
PB_RATIO .281 .219 .174 1.281 .205 
IND_DUMMY_1 22.873 12.905 .199 1.772 .081 
IND_DUMMY_5 1.907 10.935 .023 .174 .862 
IND_DUMMY_7 4.239 12.962 .037 .327 .745 
IND_DUMMY_8 -2.906 13.874 -.025 -.209 .835 
IND_DUMMY_9 1.497 8.364 .022 .179 .859 
IND_DUMMY_10 8.278 7.034 .171 1.177 .244 
IND_DUMMY_11 5.395 7.265 .103 .743 .461 
IND_DUMMY_12 -7.598 12.898 -.066 -.589 .558 
IND_DUMMY_14 -16.277 12.895 -.142 -1.262 .212 
IND_DUMMY_21 16.793 9.629 .205 1.744 .086 
IND_DUMMY_22 24.273 12.900 .211 1.882 .065 
IND_DUMMY_23 23.517 14.203 .204 1.656 .103 
IND_DUMMY_24 .099 13.794 .001 .007 .994 
IND_DUMMY_28 15.637 13.243 .136 1.181 .242 
IND_DUMMY_30 6.348 7.045 .121 .901 .371 
IND_DUMMY_31 12.462 10.632 .152 1.172 .246 
IND_DUMMY_32 3.030 8.108 .045 .374 .710 
IND_DUMMY_33 9.608 9.629 .117 .998 .322 
IND_DUMMY_34 4.711 6.923 .090 .681 .499 
IND_DUMMY_36 7.599 6.371 .179 1.193 .238 
IND_DUMMY_39 2.284 9.977 .028 .229 .820 
IND_DUMMY_41 6.579 8.425 .098 .781 .438 
IND_DUMMY_43 -8.550 9.308 -.127 -.919 .362 
IND_DUMMY_44 -3.833 7.081 -.073 -.541 .590 
IND_DUMMY_45 2.626 6.996 .050 .375 .709 
IND_DUMMY_46 23.860 10.401 .292 2.294 .025 
IND_DUMMY_47 -.352 8.690 -.005 -.041 .968 
IND_DUMMY_48 8.556 6.386 .190 1.340 .185 
 
 
42 of 54 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 15: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.2.2 
 
  
Unstandardized Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -830.286 568.637  -1.460 .157 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -10.248 5.638 -.371 -1.818 .082 
EVENT_YEARA .417 .282 .238 1.476 .153 
PB_RATIO .603 .201 .434 2.992 .006 
IND_DUMMY_1 24.980 8.664 .337 2.883 .008 
IND_DUMMY_9 4.617 7.092 .087 .651 .521 
IND_DUMMY_10 13.335 5.517 .384 2.417 .024 
IND_DUMMY_11 2.773 8.170 .052 .339 .737 
IND_DUMMY_12 -7.722 8.815 -.104 -.876 .390 
IND_DUMMY_14 -5.160 9.487 -.070 -.544 .592 
IND_DUMMY_21 23.624 6.682 .446 3.535 .002 
IND_DUMMY_22 25.852 8.673 .349 2.981 .006 
IND_DUMMY_28 5.574 11.100 .075 .502 .620 
IND_DUMMY_30 -8.360 8.620 -.113 -.970 .342 
IND_DUMMY_32 4.942 6.341 .093 .779 .443 
IND_DUMMY_34 7.662 5.313 .200 1.442 .162 
IND_DUMMY_36 19.242 5.309 .502 3.625 .001 
IND_DUMMY_41 15.554 7.055 .294 2.205 .037 
IND_DUMMY_43 -7.433 8.921 -.100 -.833 .413 
IND_DUMMY_44 3.518 8.626 .047 .408 .687 
IND_DUMMY_45 13.836 6.055 .316 2.285 .031 
IND_DUMMY_48 16.006 5.071 .418 3.156 .004 
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Table 16: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.2.3 
 
  
Unstandardized Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -66.042 1064.457  -.062 .951 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -.877 5.518 -.047 -.159 .875 
EVENT_YEARA .043 .531 .022 .082 .936 
PB_RATIO -.013 .529 -.007 -.024 .981 
IND_DUMMY_5 -19.861 22.091 -.316 -.899 .380 
IND_DUMMY_7 -17.063 21.996 -.194 -.776 .447 
IND_DUMMY_8 -17.153 24.874 -.195 -.690 .499 
IND_DUMMY_9 -9.014 21.990 -.103 -.410 .686 
IND_DUMMY_10 -1.842 23.840 -.021 -.077 .939 
IND_DUMMY_11 -14.348 18.917 -.277 -.758 .457 
IND_DUMMY_23 -.432 24.993 -.005 -.017 .986 
IND_DUMMY_24 -12.296 26.595 -.140 -.462 .649 
IND_DUMMY_30 -10.611 17.747 -.233 -.598 .557 
IND_DUMMY_31 -9.256 20.759 -.147 -.446 .661 
IND_DUMMY_32 -17.168 22.014 -.196 -.780 .445 
IND_DUMMY_33 -11.601 19.140 -.185 -.606 .552 
IND_DUMMY_34 .649 22.605 .007 .029 .977 
IND_DUMMY_36 -21.515 18.313 -.473 -1.175 .255 
IND_DUMMY_39 -19.074 19.232 -.304 -.992 .334 
IND_DUMMY_41 -18.721 22.042 -.213 -.849 .406 
IND_DUMMY_43 -28.520 22.876 -.454 -1.247 .228 
IND_DUMMY_44 -23.957 18.840 -.527 -1.272 .219 
IND_DUMMY_45 -25.245 19.252 -.402 -1.311 .205 
IND_DUMMY_46 1.450 20.207 .023 .072 .944 
IND_DUMMY_47 -20.859 18.703 -.402 -1.115 .279 
IND_DUMMY_48 -16.662 18.519 -.321 -.900 .380 
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Hypothesis 3 $4.3 
 
Table 17: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.3.1 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 1.995 4.368  .457 .650 
#STEPS .103 .099 .146 1.032 .306 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -1.358 1.500 -.148 -.906 .369 
PB_RATIO -.275 .161 -.241 -1.703 .094 
IND_DUMMY_1 -5.069 10.219 -.063 -.496 .622 
IND_DUMMY_5 -3.450 7.893 -.060 -.437 .664 
IND_DUMMY_7 8.669 10.011 .107 .866 .390 
IND_DUMMY_8 2.970 10.710 .037 .277 .783 
IND_DUMMY_9 4.056 6.375 .086 .636 .527 
IND_DUMMY_10 2.114 5.084 .062 .416 .679 
IND_DUMMY_11 4.298 5.482 .116 .784 .436 
IND_DUMMY_12 .885 9.978 .011 .089 .930 
IND_DUMMY_14 11.365 10.077 .140 1.128 .264 
IND_DUMMY_21 -1.008 7.559 -.018 -.133 .894 
IND_DUMMY_22 -8.724 10.244 -.108 -.852 .398 
IND_DUMMY_23 -4.772 10.516 -.059 -.454 .652 
IND_DUMMY_24 15.698 10.544 .194 1.489 .142 
IND_DUMMY_28 -4.975 10.306 -.061 -.483 .631 
IND_DUMMY_30 -1.289 5.419 -.035 -.238 .813 
IND_DUMMY_31 4.645 8.025 .081 .579 .565 
IND_DUMMY_32 5.877 6.264 .124 .938 .352 
IND_DUMMY_33 7.518 7.493 .131 1.003 .320 
IND_DUMMY_34 5.233 5.328 .141 .982 .330 
IND_DUMMY_36 2.523 4.709 .085 .536 .594 
IND_DUMMY_39 1.894 7.685 .033 .246 .806 
IND_DUMMY_41 5.636 6.381 .119 .883 .381 
IND_DUMMY_43 4.255 6.844 .090 .622 .536 
IND_DUMMY_44 5.521 5.453 .149 1.012 .316 
IND_DUMMY_45 3.871 5.400 .104 .717 .476 
IND_DUMMY_46 1.385 8.091 .024 .171 .865 
IND_DUMMY_47 3.992 6.629 .084 .602 .549 
IND_DUMMY_48 3.579 4.924 .113 .727 .470 
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Table 18: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.3.2 
 
   Unstandardized Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
 Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -4.700 4.416  -1.064 .291 
#STEPS .171 .100 .214 1.699 .095 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) .419 1.516 .040 .276 .783 
PB_RATIO -.109 .163 -.084 -.667 .508 
IND_DUMMY_1 -9.615 10.333 -.105 -.931 .356 
IND_DUMMY_5 -4.308 7.980 -.066 -.540 .591 
IND_DUMMY_7 11.613 10.122 .126 1.147 .256 
IND_DUMMY_8 2.866 10.829 .031 .265 .792 
IND_DUMMY_9 13.273 6.446 .247 2.059 .044 
IND_DUMMY_10 3.530 5.141 .091 .687 .495 
IND_DUMMY_11 7.106 5.542 .169 1.282 .205 
IND_DUMMY_12 7.827 10.089 .085 .776 .441 
IND_DUMMY_14 13.682 10.189 .149 1.343 .184 
IND_DUMMY_21 4.305 7.643 .066 .563 .575 
IND_DUMMY_22 -21.852 10.358 -.238 -2.110 .039 
IND_DUMMY_23 -2.776 10.633 -.030 -.261 .795 
IND_DUMMY_24 -1.853 10.661 -.020 -.174 .863 
IND_DUMMY_28 22.784 10.420 .248 2.187 .033 
IND_DUMMY_30 -3.662 5.479 -.087 -.668 .506 
IND_DUMMY_31 -.447 8.114 -.007 -.055 .956 
IND_DUMMY_32 2.420 6.333 .045 .382 .704 
IND_DUMMY_33 1.258 7.576 .019 .166 .869 
IND_DUMMY_34 4.155 5.387 .099 .771 .444 
IND_DUMMY_36 .258 4.761 .008 .054 .957 
IND_DUMMY_39 5.914 7.770 .090 .761 .450 
IND_DUMMY_41 4.824 6.452 .090 .748 .458 
IND_DUMMY_43 5.208 6.919 .097 .753 .455 
IND_DUMMY_44 12.140 5.514 .289 2.202 .032 
IND_DUMMY_45 6.923 5.460 .165 1.268 .210 
IND_DUMMY_46 -.715 8.180 -.011 -.087 .931 
IND_DUMMY_47 -5.484 6.702 -.102 -.818 .417 
IND_DUMMY_48 .728 4.978 .020 .146 .884 
      
 
  
46 of 54 | P a g e  
 
Table 19: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.3.3 
 
  
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
 Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -6.126 4.296  -1.426 .159 
#STEPS_REL 3.729 1.692 .262 2.204 .031 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) .704 1.486 .067 .474 .638 
PB_RATIO -.088 .160 -.068 -.553 .582 
IND_DUMMY_1 -9.126 10.031 -.099 -.910 .367 
IND_DUMMY_5 -4.855 7.852 -.074 -.618 .539 
IND_DUMMY_7 11.326 9.966 .123 1.136 .260 
IND_DUMMY_8 2.652 10.658 .029 .249 .804 
IND_DUMMY_9 13.536 6.347 .252 2.133 .037 
IND_DUMMY_10 3.619 5.047 .094 .717 .476 
IND_DUMMY_11 6.717 5.464 .160 1.229 .224 
IND_DUMMY_12 8.583 9.948 .093 .863 .392 
IND_DUMMY_14 13.968 9.999 .152 1.397 .168 
IND_DUMMY_21 5.124 7.410 .078 .691 .492 
IND_DUMMY_22 -20.445 9.973 -.222 -2.050 .045 
IND_DUMMY_23 -3.276 10.441 -.036 -.314 .755 
IND_DUMMY_24 -4.645 10.592 -.051 -.439 .663 
IND_DUMMY_28 23.689 10.157 .258 2.332 .023 
IND_DUMMY_30 -3.931 5.395 -.093 -.729 .469 
IND_DUMMY_31 -1.838 8.050 -.028 -.228 .820 
IND_DUMMY_32 3.380 6.231 .063 .542 .590 
IND_DUMMY_33 1.872 7.410 .029 .253 .801 
IND_DUMMY_34 4.515 5.292 .107 .853 .397 
IND_DUMMY_36 .161 4.680 .005 .034 .973 
IND_DUMMY_39 6.108 7.648 .093 .799 .428 
IND_DUMMY_41 5.455 6.336 .102 .861 .393 
IND_DUMMY_43 5.690 6.804 .106 .836 .406 
IND_DUMMY_44 12.692 5.443 .302 2.332 .023 
IND_DUMMY_45 6.837 5.375 .163 1.272 .208 
IND_DUMMY_46 -.699 7.947 -.011 -.088 .930 
IND_DUMMY_47 -5.537 6.597 -.103 -.839 .405 
IND_DUMMY_48 .757 4.878 .021 .155 .877 
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Hypothesis 4 $4.4 
 
Table 20: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.4.1 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
 Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -.585 4.770  -.123 .903 
NEW_INIT_AC 1.531 2.977 .086 .514 .609 
NEW_INIT_DK .783 3.395 .040 .231 .818 
NEW_INIT_LR 5.645 3.683 .248 1.533 .131 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -1.033 1.503 -.112 -.687 .495 
PB_RATIO -.237 .163 -.208 -1.455 .151 
IND_DUMMY_1 -2.597 10.101 -.032 -.257 .798 
IND_DUMMY_5 -3.403 7.930 -.059 -.429 .669 
IND_DUMMY_7 9.711 10.319 .120 .941 .351 
IND_DUMMY_8 -2.184 11.234 -.027 -.194 .847 
IND_DUMMY_9 4.985 6.570 .105 .759 .451 
IND_DUMMY_10 2.388 5.114 .070 .467 .642 
IND_DUMMY_11 5.111 5.532 .138 .924 .360 
IND_DUMMY_12 -3.903 10.348 -.048 -.377 .707 
IND_DUMMY_14 11.127 10.140 .137 1.097 .277 
IND_DUMMY_21 -1.106 7.637 -.019 -.145 .885 
IND_DUMMY_22 -5.338 10.243 -.066 -.521 .604 
IND_DUMMY_23 -3.252 10.515 -.040 -.309 .758 
IND_DUMMY_24 15.203 10.653 .188 1.427 .159 
IND_DUMMY_28 -2.189 10.459 -.027 -.209 .835 
IND_DUMMY_30 -.181 5.425 -.005 -.033 .973 
IND_DUMMY_31 5.644 8.100 .098 .697 .489 
IND_DUMMY_32 5.720 6.421 .121 .891 .377 
IND_DUMMY_33 6.661 7.697 .116 .865 .390 
IND_DUMMY_34 5.015 5.431 .135 .923 .360 
IND_DUMMY_36 3.704 4.801 .124 .771 .444 
IND_DUMMY_39 .137 7.939 .002 .017 .986 
IND_DUMMY_41 4.902 6.479 .104 .757 .452 
IND_DUMMY_43 2.275 6.888 .048 .330 .742 
IND_DUMMY_44 3.634 5.572 .098 .652 .517 
IND_DUMMY_45 3.498 5.453 .094 .641 .524 
IND_DUMMY_46 3.264 7.995 .057 .408 .685 
IND_DUMMY_47 4.204 6.676 .089 .630 .531 
IND_DUMMY_48 4.044 4.921 .128 .822 .415 
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Table 21: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.4.2 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) -9.723 4.856  -2.002 .050 
NEW_INIT_AC 5.315 3.030 .263 1.754 .085 
NEW_INIT_DK 4.742 3.456 .215 1.372 .175 
NEW_INIT_LR 4.914 3.750 .190 1.310 .195 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) .847 1.530 .081 .553 .582 
PB_RATIO -.066 .166 -.051 -.398 .692 
IND_DUMMY_1 -7.349 10.283 -.080 -.715 .478 
IND_DUMMY_5 -4.307 8.073 -.066 -.534 .596 
IND_DUMMY_7 10.990 10.505 .120 1.046 .300 
IND_DUMMY_8 .332 11.437 .004 .029 .977 
IND_DUMMY_9 13.541 6.689 .252 2.024 .048 
IND_DUMMY_10 3.696 5.207 .096 .710 .481 
IND_DUMMY_11 7.875 5.632 .187 1.398 .167 
IND_DUMMY_12 5.252 10.535 .057 .499 .620 
IND_DUMMY_14 14.336 10.323 .156 1.389 .170 
IND_DUMMY_21 5.649 7.774 .086 .727 .470 
IND_DUMMY_22 -18.716 10.428 -.204 -1.795 .078 
IND_DUMMY_23 -1.829 10.705 -.020 -.171 .865 
IND_DUMMY_24 -3.753 10.845 -.041 -.346 .731 
IND_DUMMY_28 24.761 10.647 .269 2.326 .024 
IND_DUMMY_30 -2.493 5.523 -.059 -.451 .653 
IND_DUMMY_31 -.692 8.246 -.011 -.084 .933 
IND_DUMMY_32 4.735 6.537 .088 .724 .472 
IND_DUMMY_33 1.458 7.836 .022 .186 .853 
IND_DUMMY_34 3.246 5.529 .077 .587 .559 
IND_DUMMY_36 .873 4.888 .026 .179 .859 
IND_DUMMY_39 4.624 8.082 .071 .572 .570 
IND_DUMMY_41 4.047 6.596 .075 .614 .542 
IND_DUMMY_43 4.643 7.013 .087 .662 .511 
IND_DUMMY_44 11.537 5.673 .274 2.034 .047 
IND_DUMMY_45 6.567 5.551 .156 1.183 .242 
IND_DUMMY_46 .793 8.139 .012 .097 .923 
IND_DUMMY_47 -5.964 6.797 -.111 -.878 .384 
IND_DUMMY_48 1.045 5.010 .029 .209 .836 
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Table 22: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.4.3 
  Unstandardized Coefficients   
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -9.502 4.805  -1.977 .053 
NEW_INIT_AB 7.152 3.285 .324 2.177 .034 
NEW_INIT_CK 3.293 3.179 .163 1.036 .305 
NEW_INIT_LR 4.602 3.707 .178 1.241 .220 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) .652 1.522 .062 .428 .670 
PB_RATIO -.020 .167 -.015 -.118 .907 
IND_DUMMY_1 -9.142 10.257 -.099 -.891 .377 
IND_DUMMY_5 -5.013 8.004 -.077 -.626 .534 
IND_DUMMY_7 12.642 10.319 .138 1.225 .226 
IND_DUMMY_8 .646 11.291 .007 .057 .955 
IND_DUMMY_9 14.665 6.566 .273 2.233 .029 
IND_DUMMY_10 4.360 5.169 .113 .844 .402 
IND_DUMMY_11 6.978 5.607 .166 1.244 .218 
IND_DUMMY_12 5.532 10.413 .060 .531 .597 
IND_DUMMY_14 14.472 10.208 .157 1.418 .162 
IND_DUMMY_21 6.608 7.651 .101 .864 .391 
IND_DUMMY_22 -17.273 10.216 -.188 -1.691 .096 
IND_DUMMY_23 -3.204 10.620 -.035 -.302 .764 
IND_DUMMY_24 -6.578 11.008 -.072 -.598 .553 
IND_DUMMY_28 26.070 10.427 .284 2.500 .015 
IND_DUMMY_30 -2.847 5.468 -.068 -.521 .605 
IND_DUMMY_31 -.439 8.142 -.007 -.054 .957 
IND_DUMMY_32 4.737 6.457 .088 .734 .466 
IND_DUMMY_33 2.431 7.705 .037 .315 .754 
IND_DUMMY_34 4.760 5.618 .113 .847 .400 
IND_DUMMY_36 1.221 4.776 .036 .256 .799 
IND_DUMMY_39 5.851 7.991 .090 .732 .467 
IND_DUMMY_41 4.163 6.506 .078 .640 .525 
IND_DUMMY_43 4.969 6.935 .093 .716 .477 
IND_DUMMY_44 11.083 5.615 .264 1.974 .053 
IND_DUMMY_45 6.467 5.467 .154 1.183 .242 
IND_DUMMY_46 -.639 8.103 -.010 -.079 .937 
IND_DUMMY_47 -4.662 6.811 -.087 -.685 .496 
IND_DUMMY_48 1.370 4.957 .038 .276 .783 
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Hypothesis 5 $4.5 
 
Table 23: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.5.1 
   Unstandardized Coefficients   
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -1.233 4.744  -.260 .796 
DM_FS_SMALL -1.479 2.918 -.079 -.507 .614 
PB_RATIO -.204 .162 -.179 -1.261 .212 
NEW_INIT_AB 3.655 3.227 .188 1.133 .262 
NEW_INIT_CK -.545 3.109 -.031 -.175 .862 
NEW_INIT_LR 5.868 3.677 .258 1.596 .116 
IND_DUMMY_1 -4.199 10.054 -.052 -.418 .678 
IND_DUMMY_5 -7.276 7.476 -.126 -.973 .335 
IND_DUMMY_7 10.315 10.018 .127 1.030 .308 
IND_DUMMY_8 -7.092 10.794 -.088 -.657 .514 
IND_DUMMY_9 5.618 6.399 .119 .878 .384 
IND_DUMMY_10 2.291 5.058 .067 .453 .652 
IND_DUMMY_11 2.238 5.650 .060 .396 .693 
IND_DUMMY_12 -3.426 10.223 -.042 -.335 .739 
IND_DUMMY_14 10.702 9.993 .132 1.071 .289 
IND_DUMMY_21 -.480 7.505 -.008 -.064 .949 
IND_DUMMY_22 -3.517 10.026 -.043 -.351 .727 
IND_DUMMY_23 -8.663 10.469 -.107 -.827 .411 
IND_DUMMY_24 9.472 11.103 .117 .853 .397 
IND_DUMMY_28 .832 10.068 .010 .083 .934 
IND_DUMMY_30 -2.116 5.367 -.057 -.394 .695 
IND_DUMMY_31 1.923 7.973 .033 .241 .810 
IND_DUMMY_32 5.473 6.335 .116 .864 .391 
IND_DUMMY_33 6.551 7.457 .114 .878 .383 
IND_DUMMY_34 5.811 5.510 .157 1.055 .296 
IND_DUMMY_36 3.452 4.625 .116 .746 .459 
IND_DUMMY_39 -1.968 8.160 -.034 -.241 .810 
IND_DUMMY_41 3.811 6.447 .081 .591 .557 
IND_DUMMY_43 -.468 6.658 -.010 -.070 .944 
IND_DUMMY_44 1.284 5.491 .035 .234 .816 
IND_DUMMY_45 2.370 5.348 .064 .443 .659 
IND_DUMMY_46 -1.088 7.751 -.019 -.140 .889 
IND_DUMMY_47 2.820 6.562 .060 .430 .669 
IND_DUMMY_48 3.174 4.858 .100 .653 .516 
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Table 24: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.5.2 
   Unstandardized Coefficients   
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -9.858 14.495  -.680 .504 
NEW_INIT_AB 14.935 7.003 .464 2.133 .044 
NEW_INIT_CK 5.095 5.960 .218 .855 .402 
NEW_INIT_LR 7.266 6.701 .249 1.084 .290 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) -1.580 7.834 -.053 -.202 .842 
PB_RATIO .300 .265 .202 1.133 .269 
IND_DUMMY_1 -13.367 12.737 -.169 -1.049 .305 
IND_DUMMY_9 23.410 9.392 .413 2.492 .021 
IND_DUMMY_10 6.126 6.981 .165 .878 .390 
IND_DUMMY_11 8.639 10.404 .152 .830 .415 
IND_DUMMY_12 5.717 12.854 .072 .445 .661 
IND_DUMMY_14 19.427 13.211 .245 1.470 .156 
IND_DUMMY_21 8.525 9.496 .150 .898 .379 
IND_DUMMY_22 -15.875 12.252 -.200 -1.296 .208 
IND_DUMMY_28 25.558 15.477 .322 1.651 .113 
IND_DUMMY_30 -11.929 12.200 -.150 -.978 .339 
IND_DUMMY_32 2.356 8.968 .042 .263 .795 
IND_DUMMY_34 8.833 7.707 .215 1.146 .264 
IND_DUMMY_36 5.100 7.827 .124 .652 .521 
IND_DUMMY_41 6.284 9.403 .111 .668 .511 
IND_DUMMY_43 2.834 12.163 .036 .233 .818 
IND_DUMMY_44 19.710 12.544 .249 1.571 .130 
IND_DUMMY_45 8.157 8.646 .174 .944 .356 
IND_DUMMY_48 -2.820 7.493 -.069 -.376 .710 
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Table 25: Full SPSS Regression Output – Regression 4.5.3 
   Unstandardized Coefficients   
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.  
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -14.801 10.616  -1.394 .181 
NEW_INIT_AB 1.772 3.592 .122 .493 .628 
NEW_INIT_CK -.006 4.427 .000 -.001 .999 
NEW_INIT_LR .882 4.836 .043 .182 .857 
LOG(FIRM_SIZE) 3.075 2.373 .305 1.296 .212 
PB_RATIO -.634 .255 -.631 -2.484 .024 
IND_DUMMY_5 -2.175 9.364 -.064 -.232 .819 
IND_DUMMY_7 16.050 11.310 .339 1.419 .174 
IND_DUMMY_8 7.450 12.633 .157 .590 .563 
IND_DUMMY_9 7.862 11.310 .166 .695 .496 
IND_DUMMY_10 3.372 11.430 .071 .295 .772 
IND_DUMMY_11 5.762 8.748 .206 .659 .519 
IND_DUMMY_23 -.998 10.521 -.021 -.095 .926 
IND_DUMMY_24 14.750 12.590 .311 1.171 .258 
IND_DUMMY_30 5.228 8.306 .213 .629 .537 
IND_DUMMY_31 .943 9.536 .028 .099 .922 
IND_DUMMY_32 10.119 10.889 .214 .929 .366 
IND_DUMMY_33 7.495 9.924 .221 .755 .460 
IND_DUMMY_34 3.858 11.439 .081 .337 .740 
IND_DUMMY_36 2.529 8.290 .103 .305 .764 
IND_DUMMY_39 7.628 10.077 .225 .757 .459 
IND_DUMMY_41 8.194 10.273 .173 .798 .436 
IND_DUMMY_43 5.463 10.466 .161 .522 .608 
IND_DUMMY_44 16.968 8.815 .692 1.925 .071 
IND_DUMMY_45 7.007 9.050 .207 .774 .449 
IND_DUMMY_46 2.278 9.028 .067 .252 .804 
IND_DUMMY_47 -1.493 9.288 -.053 -.161 .874 
IND_DUMMY_48 6.345 9.257 .227 .685 .502 
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Appendix III – Industry Classification 
 
Table 26: Overview Industry Classifications 
Industry Classifications  
 1 Agric  Agriculture 26 Guns   Defense 
 2 Food   Food Products  27 Gold   Precious Metals  
 3 Soda   Candy & Soda 28 Mines  Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 
 4 Beer   Beer & Liquor 29 Coal   Coal  
 5 Smoke  Tobacco Products  30 Oil    Petroleum and Natural Gas  
 6 Toys   Recreation 31 Util    Util ities 
 7 Fun    Entertainment 32 Telcm  Communication 
 8 Books  Printing and Publishing 33 PerSv  Personal Services  
 9 Hshld  Consumer Goods  34 BusSv  Business Services  
10 Clths  Apparel  35 Hardw  Computer Hardware 
11 Hlth   Healthcare 36 Softw  Computer Software 
12 MedEq  Medical Equipment 37 Chips  Electronic Equipment 
13 Drugs  Pharmaceutical Products  38 LabEq  Measuring and Control Equipment 
14 Chems  Chemicals  39 Paper  Business Supplies  
15 Rubbr  Rubber and Plastic Products  40 Boxes  Shipping Containers  
16 Txtls  Textiles 41 Trans  Transportation 
17 BldMt  Construction Materials  42 Whlsl  Wholesale 
18 Cnstr  Construction 43 Rtail   Retail  
19 Steel  Steel Works Etc 44 Meals  Restaurants, Hotels, Motels  
20 FabPr  Fabricated Products  45 Banks  Banking 
21 Mach   Machinery 46 Insur  Insurance 
22 ElcEq  Electrical Equipment 47 RIEst  Real Estate 
23 Autos  Automobiles and Trucks  48 Fin    Trading 
24 Aero   Aircraft 49 Other  Almost Nothing 
25 Ships  Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment  
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Table 27: Industry Classification per firm size (< or > 250 m$) category 
  
Firm Size 
Total <250 m$ >250 m$ 
   1 Agric  Agricultur 1 0 1 
 5 Smoke  Tobacco Pr 0 2 2 
 7 Fun    Entertainm 0 1 1 
 8 Books  Printing a 0 1 1 
 9 Hshld  Consumer G 2 1 3 
10 Clths  Apparel  5 1 6 
11 Hlth   Healthcare 2 3 5 
12 MedEq  Medical Eq 1 0 1 
13 Drugs  Pharmaceut 8 1 9 
14 Chems  Chemicals  1 0 1 
21 Mach   Machinery 2 0 2 
22 ElcEq  Electrical  1 0 1 
23 Autos  Automobile 0 1 1 
24 Aero   Aircraft 0 1 1 
28 Mines  Non-Metall  1 0 1 
30 Oil    Petroleum 1 4 5 
31 Util    Util ities 0 2 2 
32 Telcm  Communicat 2 1 3 
33 PerSv  Personal S 0 2 2 
34 BusSv  Business S 4 1 5 
36 Softw  Computer S 4 3 7 
39 Paper  Business S 0 2 2 
41 Trans  Transporta 2 1 3 
43 Rtail   Retail  1 2 3 
44 Meals  Restaraunt 1 4 5 
45 Banks  Banking 3 3 6 
46 Insur  Insurance 0 2 2 
47 RlEst  Real Estat 0 3 3 
48 Fin    Trading 4 3 7 
Total 46 45 91 
 
 
 
  
